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ABSTRACT:
This paper asks two questions connected by the fact that they both stem from 
the inherent incompleteness of employment contracts: in American law, how 
can the terms in employment handbooks be variable, but sometimes only 
within reasonable procedurally fair circumstances; and in English law, why 
doesn’t the implied term of mutual trust and confidence in employment 
contracts fall foul of the strict test for implication of terms into contract? This 
paper finds the answer to both questions in the doctrine of good faith. An 
analysis of good faith as a “comparative conversation” between academic and 
judicial debates in the US and England against the backdrop of the tension 
recognized by Atiyah and Summers between the rule application and 
hortatory roles of the law in a common law system leads to the conclusion 
that the doctrine of good faith acts to legitimate reasonable expectations of 
contracting parties. This conclusion is linked back to Karl Llewellyn’s vision 
of the common law as “situation sense.” It also forms the heart of the 
argument for common law reform of both English and US employment law to 
recognize explicitly the coherence creating function of good faith, and is used 
4to defend a rule of good faith variation against being subsumed by the at-will 
presumption.
1. Introduction
Voltaire’s Candide is famous for the many instances in which the main 
character encounters situations, which initially seem to be familiar and 
promising.  Despite his eternal optimism, within a fairly short space of time 
first appearances often deceive him and catapult him once again into more 
calamities. All too easily can a comparative approach to contract law between 
common law systems suffer the same fate.  The language of offer, acceptance, 
consideration, repudiation, implied terms and so on sound so like old friends 
to the common lawyer far from home. However, this familiarity can also be 
crushingly deceptive.  Nevertheless, with a little more worldliness than 
Candide, and a carefully comparative approach, disasters can be avoided; 
there is a wealth of interesting lines of inquiry.
5The contract law of both England1 and the US share mutual roots2 in 
the common law. Although the US began to forge its own distinctive path in 
developing its own style of common law, most of the tools of contractual 
analysis remained facially similar to those in England. These familiar-
sounding doctrines are not all false friends, however, and some straight 
comparison can be possible. 3 What is particularly striking is how some of 
these tools have been used in very different ways to achieve substantively 
different results.  This paper traces one such difference in the context of the 
evolution of the employment relationship to changed circumstances.
It is best to clarify one matter before we progress any further.  Much of 
the discussion in the academic literature about employment market flexibility 
concerns the at-will presumption.4 This paper will take a different course.  
This paper will not debate the question of whether the at-will presumption is 
* Harvard Law School.  Many thanks to Yael Aridor Bar Ilan, Professor Christine 
Jolls, Professor Duncan Kennedy, Roni Mann, Professor John Manning, Professor 
Todd Rakoff, and Ramsi Woodcock for their help in discussing ideas for this paper; 
however all of the errors are entirely my own.
1 For the purposes of this paper England is used to refer predominantly to the law of 
England and Wales.  Occasional references to the interpretation of the Scottish Law 
of Session and Employment Tribunals in relation to the development of the implied 
covenant of mutual trust and confidence.  However, no further mention of the 
Scottish law of contract will be included.
2 For example Blackstone’s commentaries were highly influential. See further Duncan 
Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 Buffalo L. Rev. 205 (1979)
3 Although as P.S Atiyah and Robert S. Summers note that in general “English legal 
system is highly ‘formal’ and the American highly ‘substantive,’” in the area of 
variation of employee handbooks that distinction is turned on its head.   For a very 
interesting study of English and American Law see P.S. Atiyah & Robert S. Summers, 
Form and Substance in Anglo-American Law (1987) [hereinafter Atiyah & Summers, 
Form and Substance].
4 This is the presumption that the employment relationship may be terminated at the 
‘will” of either party to the contract without notice and without cause.  See H.G. 
Wood, A Treatise on the Law of Master and Servant § 134, at 272 (William S. Hein & 
Co. 1981) (1877). 
6desirable,5 instead, the focus will be on variation within employment 
relationship itself.  Although many of the issues of employee handbook 
variation will concern variation of handbook terms relating to termination, 
the focus of this paper will be on the contractual mechanisms surrounding 
this variation, whilst the relationship is kept alive.  
1.1 The common factual dilemma
The tension between the twin poles of flexibility and concrete 
specificity in the contract will form another theme running through this 
paper.   Both the courts and the parties are caught between the desire to 
ensure certainty of the specific obligations from the moment of formation, and 
to maintain sufficient flexibility in the relationship once created.  This tension 
is present across all areas of contract law, especially where the contract is to 
last for any significant length of time, therefore it unsurprising that it is often 
particularly clear in the enforcement of contracts of employment. This tension 
manifests itself in incompleteness of the bargain.
5 Epstein, In Defence of Contract at Will, 51 U. Chi. L.R. 947; Lawrence E. Blades, 
Employment-at-will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of 
Employer Power, 67 Colum L.Rev. 11414 (1967), Cornelius J. Peck, Unjust Discharges 
from Employment: a Necessary Change in the Law, 40 Ohio St. L.J. 1 (1979), Note, 
Protecting At Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: the Duty to Terminate, 93 
Harv. L. Rev. 1816; Janice R. Bellace, A Right of Fair Dismissal: Enforcing a Statutory 
Guarantee, 16 U. Mich. J. L. Reform 207 (1983); William B.Gould IV, The Idea of the Job 
as Property in Contemporary America: The Legal and Collective Bargaining Framework, 
1986 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 885; Clyde W. Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust 
Dismissal; Time for a Statute, 62 Va. L. Rev 481 (1976); Peter Stone Partee, Note, 
Reversing the Presumption of Employment At Will, 44 Vand. L. Rev 689 (1991).  Model 
Employment Termination Act, Nationals Conference of Commissions on Uniform 
State Laws (1991).
7Contracts are left deliberately incomplete for various reasons. The first 
is that the transaction costs of bargaining for more precise provisions are often 
higher than the expected benefits.6  Secondly, and relatedly, language will not 
actually permit them to be completely exhaustive.  The longer the relationship 
is to last for, the more situations it must cover. It is not only costly but it is 
impossible, given the inherent limits of language for an employer to specify, 
ex ante, every conceivable duty and obligation of an employee and of every 
benefit which will accrue.7  Also, “…as economists have long recognized, 
however, [such] complete contracts are vanishingly rare. In practice, 
contractual [language]…tends to be marred by gaps and flaws, forcing a 
choice between intensity and extensiveness.”8
Thirdly, as Ayres and Gertner have noted, one party may sometimes 
have strategic reasons for leaving a provision underspecified.  Where one 
party is more informed than the other, if they attempt to contract around a 
certain problem, they risk alerting the less informed party to the existence of 
6 Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory 
of Default Rules, 99 Yale L. J. 87 (1989), at 92 [hereinafter Ayres and Gertner, 
Incomplete Contracts]. “These transaction costs may include legal fees, negotiation 
costs, drafting and printing costs, the costs of researching the effects and probability 
of a contingency, and the costs to the parties and the courts of verifying whether a 
contingency occurred. Rational parties will weigh these costs against the benefits of 
contractually addressing a particular contingency. If either the magnitude or the 
probability of a contingency is sufficiently low, a contract may be insensitive to that 
contingency even if transaction costs are quite low.” See also their footnote 30; O. 
Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism 70 (1985); MacNeil, Contracts: 
Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical and Relational 
Contract Law, 72 N.W.U.L. Rev. 854, 871-73 (1978); Steven Shavell, Damage Measures 
for Breach of Contract, 11 Bell. J. Econ. 466, 468 (1980)
7 cf. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (2d ed.1994), Chapter 7; Ronald Dworkin, 
Law’s Empire (1986), at 311.
8 John Donahue and Joseph Nye, Market Based Governance: Supply side, Demand 
side, Upside and Downside, (2002), 9
8the problem.9  They propose that “the possibility of strategic incompleteness 
leads us to suggest that efficiency-minded lawmakers should sometimes 
choose penalty defaults that induce knowledgeable parties to reveal 
information by contracting around the default.”10
However, in employment contracts there is a fourth reason for 
incompleteness not always encountered in other types of contract. As Hugh 
Collins notes, “contracts of employment illustrate a type of contract which is 
incomplete by design,”11 for a reason other than expected transaction costs.  
Even if every conceivable duty could be specified, both parties may not 
necessarily wish to set it “in stone” ex ante. Over-specificity runs the risk of 
ossifying the deal.  This would run against the interests of employer and 
employee; both parties often “recognize that adjustments to their obligations 
have to be made to respond to changing market conditions.” 12 Flexibility is 
desired by both parties. This is not a situation of informational asymmetry 
alone; even if all the information which could have been known ex ante was 
complete on both sides, and transaction costs were removed, neither party 
would necessarily wish to set it in stone ex ante.
It is a common feature of long term contracts on both sides of the 
Atlantic that they “must often be phrased in broad, flexible terms to enable 
the parties to adjust their bargain to meet changed circumstances.”13 In 
employment contracts, in order to mitigate this inherent tension between the 
9  Ayres and Gertner, Incomplete Contracts, supra note 6 at 94.
10 Ayres and Gertner, Incomplete Contracts, supra note 6  at 94
11 Hugh Collins, The Law of Contract (4d ed. 2003), at 331
12 Hugh Collins, The Law of Contract (4d ed. 2003), at 331.
13 Ewan McKendrick, The Regulation of Long term Contracts in English Law in Good 
Faith and Fault in Contract Law 305 (Beatson & Friedmann eds.,1995).
9need for specificity of the obligations, and the need to retain flexibility within 
the bargain, employers often either retain broad contractual discretions or 
issue employee handbooks.14  These set out company rules and policies on 
employee obligations, benefits, sick and pregnancy leave, dismissal process, 
harassment complaint mechanisms and so forth. 
1.2 Two questions
US and English law therefore face a common dilemma in how to 
control variation of these employment handbooks and how to conceive of the 
employment relationship more generally.  In both jurisdictions some 
handbooks terms have been held to have contractual effect.  However, in 
order to maintain flexibility the law also regulates the degree to which such 
specifying documents are subject to change.   Some provision for variation of 
the rules and policies contained within such handbooks must be provided for 
in order to prevent the contract pinning the parties into an inefficient deal. 
This paper will be concerned with two specific questions against this 
background.  Firstly, in England the courts’ approach is highly influenced by 
the implied term of mutual trust and confidence.  However, this term is stated 
in such broad terms that it appears, on first glance, not to pass the test for 
implication of terms into contracts used in the rest of English contract law.  
Also, it appears to affect the interpretation of the other terms of the contract 
14 Pauline Kim, found that in 1996 51% employees said that they had been issued 
handbooks before the accepted their job offer.  Pauline T. Kim, Bargaining with 
Imperfect Information:  A Study of Worker Perceptions of Legal Protection in an At-Will 
World, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 105 (1997), 146.  
10
into which it is implied to a greater degree than traditional contract scholars 
would expect.15
The second issue relates to the treatment of employee handbooks by 
some of the US states.  The basis for permitting variation to these handbook 
provisions is in conceptual disarray with three main approaches being 
applied across different states.  Some states do not allow any variation 
without additional consideration,16 some permit any variation, provided 
actual notice is given17 and some permit variation, but only with reasonable 
notice.   This third approach, although the most attractive intuitively, 
currently lies on a very uncertain contractual doctrinal framework.
The search for a solution to these two questions will take the form of a 
“comparative conversation” between the two legal systems. This will bring 
together the cases, principles, academic commentary and a few statutory 
provisions from both sides of the Atlantic in order to tease out these difficult 
questions. A large amount of the difference can be accounted for in the 
difference between the terms implied “default rules.”18   Implied terms play 
such a large part in employment contracts as the parties rarely specify many 
terms expressly, if at all.  As Mark Freedland notes, “compared to that of 
many other types of contract, the content of personal work or employment 
15 See Andrew Phang, Implied Terms in English Law - Some Recent Developments [1993] 
J.B.L. 242 and Johnstone v. Bloomsbury Area Health Authority [1991] 2 W.L.R. 1362 
per Leggatt L.J.
16 Demasse v. ITT Corp. 984 P. 2d. 1138 (1999) [hereinafter Demasse].
17 Govier v. North Sound Bank, 91 Wash. App. 493, 957 P.2d 811 (1998).
18 Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent, (1992) 
78 Va. L.R. 821, 823-5.
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contracts is to a very large extent dependent on implied terms.”19 However, 
the cases also betray a difference in the way the other formal doctrines are 
applied; for example, bilateral offer and acceptance and the doctrine of 
consideration is applied differently to variation of the terms of employment 
across the states of the US as well as across the Atlantic.  The ways these 
formal and substantive doctrines interact have important consequences for 
the legal presumptions used by the courts in both applying and interpreting 
contracts of employment.  
This paper will take the doctrine of good faith as a focus for unraveling 
some of these dilemmas and argue that it has been underutlised by courts on 
both sides of the Atlantic.  The coherence forming function of good faith has 
often been overlooked.  However, in order to argue for theoretical coherence, 
as well as “justice” case-by-case, it will become essential to analyze the nature 
of “good faith” and its operation as a legal mechanism in common law 
adjudication. 
1.3 Tensions within adjudication: Atiyah and Llewellyn
Not only is there a tension inherent in the factual pattern of the 
employment relationship but the courts in both the US and England also face 
a common dilemma within the process of common law adjudication itself. 
This tension is recognized by Patrick Atiyah as the discord between the 
court’s function as an arbiter of individual disputes and its role as setting out 
legal principle for the settlement of future disputes, which he terms the 
19 Mark Freedland, The Personal Employment Contract (2003), at 119.
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hortatory function.20  Good faith is an abstract concept; if it is to have any 
utility it must both serve a useful hortatory function and the function of 
individual dispute settlement in the case at hand.  It will be argued that part 
of the Court’s reluctance to use this concept within the employment 
relationship on both sides of the Atlantic can be traced to this tension.  Courts 
are either worried that it will be too hortatory and infect other doctrines with 
its overbreadth, or are skeptical of its ability to determine concrete cases.
Some of the predominant commentators on good faith have criticized the 
founding father of the Uniform Commercial Code, for misunderstanding the 
project of conceptualization, for incorporating concept of good faith,21 which 
was insufficiently coherent.22  However, it will be argued that Karl Llewellyn’s 
methodology of deciding cases by situation sense has greater appeal than 
many have given it.23 “Situation sense” is the method of dispute resolution 
20
 P.S. Atiyah, Pragmatism and Theory in English Law (1987) especially at 125 
[hereinafter Pragmatism and Theory]; P.S Atiyah, From Principles to Pragmatism: 
Changes in the Function of the Judicial Process and the Law, 65 Iowa L Rev 1202 (1980), 
[hereinafter Atiyah, Principles to Pragmatism].  Also in M.A. Eisenberg, the Nature of 
the Common Law (1988) pp4-7 it is noted that the courts have two businesses, that of 
deciding individual disputes, and of enriching our body of legal norms. See also
Elizabeth Peden, Policy Concerns Behind Implication of Terms in Law, 30 L.Q.R. 459 
(2001).  Peden noticed that the strictness of the necessity test can lead to seeming 
incoherence; “when the courts focus too intensely on whether a term is “necessary,” 
rather than relying on broad principles, the results can be unfortunate.”
21 UCC § 1-203
22 Robert S. Summers, The General Duty of Good Faith – its Recognition and 
Conceptualisation 67 Cornell L. Rev. 810,  825 (1982).
23 See Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on Theory of Appellate Decisions, 3 Vand. L. Rev. 395, 
(1950) 398.  A notable use of “Situation Sense” praised and utilized constructively is 
in Todd D. Rakoff, The Implied Terms of Contracts: Of ‘Default Rules’ and ‘Situation 
Sense,’ in Good Faith and Fault in Contract Law (Jack Beatson and David Friedmann 
eds., 1995) [herienafter Rakoff, Situation Sense]
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put forward by Llewellyn in his later work, of reasoning by “type facts in 
their context.”24  He saw this as best captured by Levin Goldschmidt:
“every fact pattern of common life, so far as the legal order can take it in, carried 
within itself its appropriate, natural rules, its right law.   This is a natural law 
which is real, not imaginary; it is not a creature of mere reason, but rest on the 
solid foundation of what reason can recognize in the nature of man and of the life 
conditions of the time and place.”25
However, as Todd Rakoff has convincingly argued, this passage can make 
situation sense sound rather too “mystical.”26 In fact Llewellyn’s methodology 
does not fall into being mere intuitionism; it is “meant to be both a practical 
and creative human activity, and not mere divination.”27
This methodology captures much of the essence of the dispute 
settlement function of judges. In a system operating the situation sense 
method the judge is applying the type fact specific application of the rule.  
This explains why good faith can be described by Summers as excluding 
multifarious different facets of “bad faith” conduct.28 Use of a situation sense 
method does not preclude the judge from recognizing general unifying 
principles. It should be remembered that finding the appropriate solution to 
24 Karl N. Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals (1960), at 60. 
and 121-154 [hereinafter Karl Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition].
25 Leon Goldschmidt, Preface to Kritik des Entwurfs eines Handelsgesetzbuchs, Krit. 
Zeitschr. F.d.ges. Rechtswissenschaft, Vol 4, No. 4. Cited in supra Karl N. Llewellyn, 
The Common Law Tradition, note 24 at 122
26 supra Rakoff, Situation Sense note 23, at 202.
27Rakoff, Situation Sense, supra note 23at 203
28 Robert R. Summers, "Good Faith" in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions 
of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 Va.L.Rev. 195, 201 (1968)
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“type facts in their context”29 is itself an important principle. It is important 
for the central thesis that Llewellyn’s methodology does not preclude the 
possibility of principles of substantive law aiding in the process, of a situation 
sense judgment.30
The tension between general hortatory function and tightness to the 
individual dispute is clearly visible in English law in relation to the implied 
term of mutual trust and confidence.  The courts purport to be constrained by 
a strict test which permits the implication of terms only in very narrowly 
defined circumstances, which pushes the courts away from the more general 
into a term tailored as closely as possible to the fact pattern of the case.  This 
deliberately down-plays any hortatory effect of an implication.  The reason 
behind this is always cited as being the fiction that courts role is only as in 
filling small gaps in contracts, rather than dealing more generally at the level 
of default standards.  In employment contracts, which are naturally 
incomplete, this is a fiction.
An implication of a good faith term, therefore poses large problems for 
the way English courts view their own role.  Until they are comfortable with 
their hortatory role they will not be comfortable with the concept of 
principles.  However, there is a paradox: by playing down their hortatory 
role, the English courts are forced into considerations of policy to decide 
individual cases.  General assertions of the parties which go beyond the fact 
pattern of the case are tested against a general “floodgates” argument of 
“public policy.”  This conception of “public policy” is often ill informed and 
29 Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition, supra note 24.
30 This is noted by P.S. Atiyah, Pragmatism and Theory, supra note 20, at 89-143
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undertheorised.31  This paper will argue for an approach which appeals to 
good faith as a principle, and not just as a policy.
One of the problems faced by courts in both the US and the UK is that 
broad hortatory principles often conflict.  Recognition of conflict at the level of 
principle is not new within contract law,32 however it is one which is in need 
of careful treatment when a solution is proposed in practice. In US law there 
is a potential for conflict between the hortatory effect of good faith and the 
hortatory effect of the at-will presumption.   However in this particular 
situation, this can be resolved without necessarily requiring the demise of the 
at-will rule by separating out the content of the individual dispute settlement 
norm from the hortatory function of the principle.    Specific applications of 
the good faith, or at will principles, can be used on the lowest level of 
abstraction as rules, without annihilating either principle.  The hortatory 
function of the at-will presumption will be reduced by the recognition of the 
good faith principle in variation, where previously it had affected the rhetoric 
of the more pro-variation cases and dissents.33  Although issues concerning 
variation and termination may, in some senses be similar, they are 
importantly different.  The requirements of good faith have a stronger claim 
on the regulation of variation of the contract than termination as the 
31See further section 4.1.2.
32 Particularly in the US, for example, it is a common theme within the work of the 
American Legal Realists and Critical Legal Studies Movement.  See further: F. Cohen, 
The Ethical Basis of Legal Criticism, 41 Yale L.J. 201 (1931); F. Cohen, Transcendental 
Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 Colum. L. Rev. 809 (1935); Duncan Kennedy, 
Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1685 (1976); Clare 
Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 Yale, L.J. 997 (1985); 
Ronald Dworkin recognizes that conflict of principles is also a problem which his 
hypothetical ideal judge, Hercules, must contend with, Law’s Empire, (1986), 177.
33 E.g. the dissent of Jones V.C.J. in Demasse, supra note 16.
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relationship is purported to be continuing.  This separation of variation and 
termination can be supported by arguments from autonomy and efficiency.
Therefore, bearing all of these tensions in mind, we will start with an 
analysis framed from situation sense.  First of all the “handbook variation” 
situation will be considered from the US approach, and then from the English 
approach.  The English approach will introduce the broader issues of the 
conceptualization of the relationship between the parties.  This will set the 
scene for the comparative conversation and analysis of the potential role of 
good faith.  Once the role of good faith has been introduced the paper will 
consider the ramifications for this at the level of principle and rule application 
on the at-will presumption.  
17
2.  Variation of handbooks: the US approaches
Handbooks provide a crucial mechanism for employers to specify 
employee obligations, policies and benefits.   Historically the US state courts 
have been hesitant to accept any contractual effect of employee handbooks, 
for example in Johnson v. National Beef Packing Co. the Kansas Supreme Court 
held that a handbook was “only an expression of company policy and 
procedures.  Its terms were not bargained for by the parties and any benefits 
conferred by it were mere gratuities.”34  However from the early 1980s the 
courts showed increased willingness to consider the effects of handbooks in 
contract or promissory estoppel.35  This paper will not attempt to set out the 
development of the employee handbook jurisprudence as this is set out 
admirably in articles by Kohn and by Pratt,36 but instead to sketch out by way 
of case example three of the predominant modern approaches. This will be 
followed by a consideration of the policy arguments surrounding the area.
The states are divided over the contractual basis for enforcement of 
terms within employee handbooks.  Some states consider the handbook to 
34 551 P.2d 779, 782 (Kansas 1976).  See further Brian T. Kohn, Contracts of Convenience: 
Preventing Employers from Unilaterally Modifying Promises Made in Employee Handbooks, 
24 Cardozo L.Rev. 799, 812 (2003) 
35 Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 292 N.W.2d 880 (Mich. 1980) 
(legitimate expectations analysis); Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 
(Minn. 1983); Woolley v. Hoffmann La Roche, 491 A.2d 1257 (New Jersey 1985)
(unilateral contract analysis), Hammond v. N.D. State Pers. Bd., 345 N.W.2d 359, 361 
(N.D. 1984) (promissory estoppel).
36 Kohn;, supra note 34; Richard J. Pratt, Comment, Unilateral Modification of 
Employment Handbooks: Further Encroachments on the Employment At-Will Doctrine, 139 
U. Pa. L. Rev. 197 (1990). See also Stephen Carey Sullivan, Comment, Unilateral 
Modification of Employee Handbooks: A Contractual Analysis, 5 Regent U. L. Rev. 261 
(1995)
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constitute a unilateral contract, whereas others treat it as an independent 
bilateral contract.  This has large implications for whether the courts consider 
consideration to be necessary for variation. 
2.1  No consideration required: Govier v. North Sound Bank37
Ms. Govier, on the first day of her employment was given a copy of the 
personnel handbook.  Although she had not been told at the time that her 
employment was for any specific length of time, the handbook provided that 
“a probationary period lasting the first ninety days of your new job applies to 
all new employees….If you reach the end of this probationary period 
successfully, you will have your fist formal performance appraisal interview 
with your supervisor prior to the end of your first ninety days, and you will 
be considered a permanent employee, assuming continued satisfactory performance 
(italics added).”  It additionally provided that once the probationary period 
was over “you would not be dismissed for poor performance without first being 
counseled…and given an opportunity to improve your performance.”
During Govier’s employment, the bank varied the handbook 
unilaterally at least eight times.  The distribution of a memo to all employees 
was deemed to be the moment of modification.
In 1993 the Bank’s presented new agreements to Govier and her loan 
originator colleagues and told them that they must sign the contracts by 17th
December or be terminated.   The new terms were less favorable in that they 
37 91 Wash. App. 493, 957 P.2d 811 (1998) [hereinafter Govier]
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eliminated sick leave, holiday and vacation pay and allowed either party to 
terminate on 20 days notice.
Seinfeld J for the court held that “an employer may unilaterally amend 
or revoke policies and procedures established in an employee handbook” 
regardless of whether this power is reserved expressly.”38  The court held that 
bilateral contract analysis was not appropriate as the bank had, without her 
consent, varied the handbook at least eight times. Seinfeld J held that “the law 
should not tie employers to anachronistic policies in perpetuity merely 
because they failed to expressly reserve at the outset the right to make policy 
changes.”39 The court held that the only requirement was that the employer 
must notify the employee of the change.
This approach has drastic results for Ms. Govier as, by refusing to 
accept the new terms, she is caught ‘between a rock and a hard place.’  She 
can neither rely on her previous contractual terms, as they had been validly 
unilaterally varied, nor may she rely on the new terms as she had refused to 
sign the new agreements.40 In effect, her contract therefore practically 
“evaporates.” 
2.2 Consideration is required: Demasse v. ITT Corp.41
38 Id. at 816
39 Id. at  816
40 Govier, supra note 37, at 817
41 supra note 16. Arizona law applied by the US Court of appeals for the 9th circuit on 
diversity jurisdiction. Similar cases in other jurisdictions include Torosayan v. 
Boehringer Ingleheim Pharm. (1995) 234 Conn. 1, 662 A.2d 89; Brodie v. General 
Chemical Corp (Wyo, 1997) 934 P.2d 1263, 1268; Robinson v. Ada S. McKinley 
Community Services (7th Cir 1994) 19 F.3d 359, 364)
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This case involved a change to the mechanism of deciding which 
employees would be dismissed in the situation of a need for collective 
redundancy.  The employment handbooks originally provided that layoffs 
would be carried out in reverse order of seniority (commonly referred to as 
“last in, first out,” or “LIFO” in English cases).  It expressly provided that 
“ITT Cannon reserves the right to amend, modify or cancel this handbook as 
well as any or all of the various policies, rules, procedures and programs 
outlined in it.”  In 1993 ITT changed its layoff guidelines such that layoffs 
would not be performed under LIFO, but on each employee’s “abilities and 
documentation of performance.”42  All of the plaintiffs were laid off before less 
senior employees and attempted to rely on their pre 1989 contract provisions.
Feldman J held, under Arizona law, that “when employment 
circumstances offer a term of job security to an employee who might 
otherwise be dischargeable at will and the employee acts in response to that 
promise, the employment relationship is no longer at will but is instead 
governed by the terms of the contract.”43  In a unilateral contract, once the 
offer is accepted by performance, the terms cannot be changed.   The court 
held that as there is no difference in law between express and implied 
contracts, an implied contract cannot be varied without offer, acceptance and 
consideration”44.  Crucially, in addition, the court added that “continued 
42 Demasse, supra note 16, para. 7.
43 Id. para. 14.  The court considers that a handbook is typically made up from 
promissory and non promissory terms.  See Sodelun v. Public Service co 944 P.2d616, 
621 (Colo.App.1997).  The court cites Pratt, supra  note 34.
44 Demasse, supra note 16, para. 19
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employment after issuance of a new handbook does not constitute 
acceptance.”45
In defiant strain Feldman J took the opposite policy approach to that 
taken in Govier.  He recognized that “if a contractual job security provision 
can be eliminated by unilateral modification, an employer can essentially 
terminate the employee at any time, thus abrogating any protection provided 
the employee.  For example, an employer could terminate an employee who 
has a job security provision simply by saying, “I revoke that term and, as of 
today, you’re dismissed.”46
Jones, VCJ, concurring in part and dissenting in part, argued that it 
was necessary, as a matter of employment law, that “once an employer takes 
action, for whatever reasons, an employee must either accept those changes, 
quit, or be discharged.  Because the employer retains this control over the 
employment relationship, unilateral acts of the employer are binding on its 
employees and both parties should understand this rule.”47
In reply to Justice Jones’ dissent, the court argued, “to those who 
believe our conclusion will destroy an employer’s ability to update and 
modernize its handbook, we can only reply that the great majority of 
handbook terms are certainly non-contractual and can be 
revised…permission to modify can always be obtained by mutual agreement 
and for consideration.”
45 Id. para. 23, citing 1 s. Williston, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts § 91 (W. Jaeger 
3d ed. 1957)
46 Demasse, supra note 16, para. 28.
47 Id. para 58
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2.3  Unilateral variation with reasonable notice: Asmus v. Pacific Bell48
The benefit at issue in Asmus was a “Management Employment Security 
Policy” (MESP), which Pacific Bell had previously offered management level 
employees.  This provided that, “it will be Pacific Bell’s policy to offer all 
management employees who continue to meet our changing business 
expectations employment security through reassignment to and retraining for 
other management positions, even if their present jobs are eliminated.  This 
policy will be maintained so long as there is no change that will materially 
affect Pacific Bell’s business plan achievement.”  In 1990 Pacific Bell notified 
its employees that it might need to discontinue the MESP “given the reality of 
the marketplace, changing demographics of the workforce and the continued 
need for cost reduction.”  In October 1991 Pacific Bell notified its employees 
that it would discontinue the policy as of 1st April 1992.
The court held that for unilateral contract that “once the promissor 
determines after a reasonable time that it will terminate or modify the 
contract, and provides employees with reasonable notice of the change, 
additional consideration is not required.” Approving Justice Jones’ dissent in 
Demasse they held that “the mutuality of obligation principle requiring new 
consideration for contract termination applied to bilateral contracts only.”  
They also held that a rule holding that continued performance of employment 
did constitute consideration and to hold other wise “would contradict the 
general principle that the law will not concern itself with the adequacy of 
consideration.”
48 96 Cal.Rptr 2d 179 
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George CJ dissented, arguing that the majority had misinterpreted 
ordinary contract law, as had the majority in Demasse. He also argued that the 
economic incentives of the majority’s holding “condones and encouraged 
manipulative, oppressive and unfair treatment of employees” as it permits an 
employer to rescind a promise “simply because the promise later becomes 
inconvenient or financially disadavantageous to the employer during an 
economic downturn, a time when the employee would most expect to be able 
to rely upon and benefit from the employer’s promise.”49  Such contractual 
promises, he asserts, if they could be altered so easily “would only be as good 
as the employer’s desire to keep the promise at some unspecified point in the 
future.”  He sees the key as being the employer’s ability to contract out of the 
obligation ex ante with regard to new employees.
Although George CJ in Asmus argues that, if the employer is concerned 
about flexibility of handbooks, she should expressly forbear from incurring 
obligations in the first place, this is not necessarily desirable for either party. 
As discussed in the first chapter, there is always a tension between the needs 
of specificity and flexibility; to dismiss this tension in this offhand manner is 
not likely to lead to coherence.   The law should not be encouraging 
employers not to provide any degree of specificity at all.  Specificity is not 
only useful for the employer, but the employee too, as they gain notice of 
their rights and obligations.
2.3.1 Substantive fairness and good faith – a slightly different approach
49 Id., at 20.
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It is arguable that the approach in Bankey v. Storer Broad. Co., 50 is a different 
approach from that adopted in Asmus.51 Twelve years before the Supreme 
Court of Michigan had held in Toussaint v. Blue Cross Blue Shield52 that an 
employee may “legitimately expect” that his employer will uniformly apply 
personnel policies “in force at any time.” However, in Bankey the Supreme 
Court of Michigan reduced the scope of this ruling by holding that an 
employer may amend the handbook “from time to time” even if no discretion 
to amend was included within the handbook. The Court nevertheless 
cautioned, “against an assumption that our answer would condone changes 
made in bad faith.” Poetically, the Court argued that “fairness suggests that a 
discharge-for-cause policy announced with flourishes and fanfare at noonday 
should not be revoked by a pennywhistle trill at midnight” therefore 
reasonable notice must be required.
Brian Kohn and Jason Walters consider this to be a different approach 
altogether.53  Kohn sees the court as having “eschewed the contractual 
analysis altogether.”  This is a very strong reading of Bankey.  Griffen J did not 
entirely dispense with contractual analysis before delving in to the policies to 
be weighed.  After an exhaustive analysis of the case law, he held, instead that 
“the principles on which Toussaint is based would be undermined if an 
employer could benefit from the good will generated by a discharge-for –
50 432 Mich. 438, 443 N.W.2d 112, 113 (Mich. 1989) [hereinafter Bankey]. 
51 See Kohn, supra note 34.
52 Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., supra note 35
53 Kohn, supra note 34. Jason A. Walters, The Brooklyn Bridge is Falling Down: 
Unilateral Contract Modification and the Sole Requirement of the Offeree’s Assent, 32 
Cumb. L. Rev. 375.
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cause policy while unfairly manipulating the way in which it is revoked.”54
Although traditional contract analysis des not reach a decisive result in this 
case, this does not necessarily mean that the courts’ reasoning was set loose 
ungrounded into the realm of policy balancing. This is not a decision made 
entirely on “policy” but from an important “hortatory principle.”55 Griffen J 
also cautioned “against an assumption that our answer would condone 
changes made in bad faith.”56 The use of the language of “bad faith” intimates 
that the true rationale behind Toussaint appeals to the principle of good faith.  
As will be argued further below, arguments from principle appeal to a more 
persuasive level of coherence and depth than mere assertions of “policy.”57
2.3.2 What is reasonable notice?
Before the comparison may continue to analysis of the basis for this 
requirement it is necessary to take a short side step and consider briefly what 
is regarded as reasonable notice in the states which have adopted and 
recognize this condition.  For example in Asmus, the two year period from 
1990 was held to be “ample.”  In Al- Safin v. Circuit City Stores, Inc.,58 the Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit applying Washington law held that posting 
change to arbitration policy in stores and in applicant packets did not 
54 Bankey, supra note 50, at 457
55 For this distinction in more detail see Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 
(1978) Ch. 4.   Although Dworkin is, himself inconsistent with the terminology, the 
distinction is important as principles appeal to coherence at a system wide level, 
whereas “public policy” is an often pejorative term for unsophisticated balancing of 
individuals interests in a case.
56 Bankey supra note 50, at 456
57 At section 4.2.1.
58 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 747
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constitute reasonable notice to former employees. However in Mannix v. 
County of Monroe,59 the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, applying 
Michigan law, held that “Distribution of a new employee handbook 
constitutes reasonable notice, regardless of whether the affected employee 
actually reads it.  In Highstone v. Westin Engineering,60 the Court of Appeal for 
the Sixth Circuit applying Michigan law held that publishing the handbook 
online and sending 2 emails one month in advance, were sufficient to show 
reasonable notice.  The method used to distribute amendment, they held, 
must be uniform and reasonable.61  Therefore we can see that, although the 
case law is not entirely consistent the court tends to look to whether the 
employer went through reasonable efforts to notify the employees; the 
standard appears to be constructive, rather than actual, notice.
2.4 Policy arguments
The following chapters will advocate an approach which takes the 
same policy direction as Asmus, Bankey and some of the sentiments from 
Demasse.  This is for five reasons.
Firstly, the Govier rule is in neither the interests of the employee nor the 
employer.  The tension between flexibility and certainty, mentioned in the 
previous chapter, does not map on exactly to the interests of the employer as 
opposed to the interests of the employee.  This tension plays itself out within 
the interests of both of the parties to the contract. It is too simple to say that 
59 348 F.3d 526 (2003)
60 187 F.3d 548, 552-53 (6th Cir. 1999),
61 Grow v. General Products Inc., 184 Mich. App. 379, 457 N.W.2d 167 (1990), appeal 
denied, 439 Mich. 871, 478 N.W.2d 92 (1991).
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the employer has an interest in maintaining her own flexibility as complete 
flexibility for the employer may be harmful to her employer’s interests.  For 
example, Slawson argues62 that a rule which allows the employer to vary its 
express promises without notice “deprives employers of a valuable 
bargaining chip with their employees, and of a valuable means of attracting 
and keeping desirable employees, and of increasing its employees’ job 
satisfaction and loyalty.” This is because a well-informed employee knows 
that any promise will be revoked.  
Secondly, as the employee will have no incentive to bargain for such an 
unenforceable promise, this will have the effect of mandating at-will 
employment, as any promises of job security will be, themselves, revocable at-
will.  This is an inefficient outcome, as those employees who would value 
these extra safeguards will be practically precluded from securing them.63
In addition, “the employer’s inability to make enforceable promises of 
employment security will also put both employees who do not want to join 
unions and their employers who do not want them to join at an unfair 
disadvantage. . . . Union organizers in the states where the courts [permit 
unilateral modification] can now tell employees that no matter what their 
employers may promise them, the only way they can obtain rights—rather 
than just unenforceable promises—of employment security is to join a union.” 
62 W. David Slawson, Unilateral Contracts of Employment: Does Contract Law Conflict 
with Public Policy? 10 Tex. Wesleyan L. Rev. 9, 30-31 (2003).
63 Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics (2d ed 1997) ch4. Easterbrook 
& Fischel, Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law; the Corporate Contract, 89 Colum. L. 
Rev. 1416 (1989); Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 81 (3d ed. 1986), cited in Ayres 
and Gertner, supra note 6, at 91.
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As Professor Hugh Collins has noted, “although the willingness to adapt is an 
essential ingredient in a co-operative and productive working relation…a fear 
that this discretionary power will be operated unfairly by an employer is 
likely to subvert the cooperation.”64
Fourthly, as noted above, neither the employer nor the employee is 
well served by a complete lack of specificity in the terms.  As was noted in the 
discussion of George CJ’s dissent in Asmus, some degree of specificity is in the 
interests of the employer, as this helps them to direct the employees.65
Employees are also benefited by increased specificity as this allows them to be 
more certain what duties they owe and what benefits they can expect in 
return. In the United Kingdom, the obligation to provide a written statement 
of particulars of employment,66 is considered to be one of the first modern 
employment rights to have been enacted. 67
Fifthly, the situation of handbook variation will always have an 
inherent asymmetry, as the variation will be solely at the instigation of the 
employer.  The employer knows what the new variation will be in advance of 
its effect, but if the variation is deemed to take effect immediately, the 
employee does not.  Professors Ayres and Gertner have proposed a theory of 
how to decide when default rules in contract should be penalty defaults.  
Penalty defaults are used to remedy certain informational asymmetries 
inherent in a relationship.  A rule, which provided for reasonable notice, 
64 Hugh Collins, Employment Law (2003), at 106.
65 Discussed at section 2.3.
66 First enacted in the Contracts of Employment Act 1963 (now repealed); now 
contained within Employment Rights Act 1996 s. 1
67 Simon Deakin & Gillian Morris, Labour Law (3d ed 2001), at 249.
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would not be a traditional type of penalty default, as information is not 
elicited when the stronger party contracts round it, but later in the contract 
performance itself.  In this situation, the penalty is in the information about 
the content of the new terms the employer must provide the employees with 
in reasonable time for a lawful variation to take place.  This added time to 
consider the new terms will allow the employees opportunity to decide 
whether to remain in this employment or seek other opportunities elsewhere.
Such a penalty default rule could avoid another informational 
asymmetry in the case of variation of handbooks within a contract which is 
already at-will (although this situation was not covered on the facts of the 
cases cited above). In this situation an employer can terminate the 
employment without notice at any time. This paper will argue that such 
contracts should not be simply variable at-will in the same way as they are 
terminable.  In altering the terms of employment in an at-will contract, the 
employer is, in effect, terminating the relationship.  It is possible that this 
might not be self evident to an employee, who is still receiving instructions 
from the employer. A terminated employee considering re-engagement on 
different terms, if unaware of the nature of at-will employment, may consider 
themselves to be under less control and with “less to lose” than the employee 
who is purportedly retained, but under different conditions. 
The question of employee expectations in this situation is clearly an 
empirical one. An employee may or may not have more expectations of what 
they are due under the contract, depending on how aware they are of the 
background default rules.  Some employees, it seems have a large degree of 
30
faith in legal default rules, over explicit statements in contracts.  For example, 
Pauline Kim has conducted an empirical study into employee expectations 
relating to dismissal.  She found that even where a handbook provided that 
the “Company reserves the right to discharge employees at any time, for any 
reason, with or without cause” 62.6% of employees nevertheless believed that 
discharge without cause is unlawful.68 A similar method to the one used by 
Professor Kim could be used to test the hypothesis that at-will employees 
consider variation in their employment terms as different to their termination.  
If employees have such a degree of faith in legal default rules to protect them 
from the employer terminating them at-will, it would be interesting to 
discover whether there was also a high level of ignorance of the employee’s 
right to unilaterally walk away from the contract at any time. If a significant 
degree of ignorance would be found a penalty default requiring reasonable 
notice of variation, could ensure that this informational asymmetry would be 
corrected.
2.5 Summary of the US arguments
The different states seem to be in conceptual confusion over the appropriate 
policy and legal basis for handbook variation, oscillating between requiring 
no notice and conceptualizing the relation as unilateral, and between 
requiring consideration or reasonable notice and considering the relation to 
be bilateral.  None of the approaches described are without their various 
68 Pauline T. Kim, supra note 14, A study of unemployment claimants was carried out 
during August, September and October of 1996 in St Louis City and County, 
Missouri. Claimants with different levels of education, between no high school 
diploma and graduate degree were assessed.
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problems.  Unilateral or bilateral analysis here is used little more than as a 
label for the policy approach recognized by the courts.  In this confusion it is 
unsurprising that the Courts in Bankey and Asmus, plumped for an “in 
between approach.” The strands assembled in this Chapter will be reanalyzed 
and a proposal for coherence suggested as part of the comparative 
conversation of Chapter 4.  However, before this is possible, the English 
position must be first put on the table.
3. Handbooks in England
The existence of an employment handbook is not sufficient to give it 
contractual effect. English Law requires an employer to give every employee 
on employment a written statement of particulars of employment under 
section 1 of the Employment Rights Act 1996. English law treats the important 
issue is instead one of whether it is incorporated into the employment 
contract itself.  As in most states in the US, as far as a handbook contains a 
codification of policy instructions to employees, these do not have contractual 
effect and are the subject of managerial prerogative, and therefore may be 
varied unilaterally without notice.69
3.1 The question of incorporation
The main practitioners guide, Harvey on Industrial Relations and 
Employment Law states that the test for whether handbook terms are 
incorporated into the contract of employment is “whether it is reasonably to 
be inferred from the circumstances that the parties must have intended them 
69 Secretary of State for Employment v. ASLEF (No 2) [1972] 2 Q.B. 455, Simon Deakin 
& Gillian Morris, Labour Law (3d 2001), at 268.
32
to have contractual force.”70  For example in Petrie v. Mac Fisheries Ltd71 the 
court held that displaying a notice about sick pay entitlements on the factory 
noticeboard was insufficient.
The terms must also be suitable for incorporation in to the contract.  
The courts and Employment Tribunals divide terms in a handbook between 
terms and policies.  Policies tend to be treated as mere instances of managerial 
prerogative.  Policies must nevertheless be “introduced for a legitimate 
purpose” and must be consistent with the implied term of mutual trust and 
confidence discussed below.72
The test for whether provisions in a handbook are incorporated is 
always a difficult matter of construction, for which the Courts and 
Employment tribunals use a variety of tests.  In Quinn v. Calder Industrial 
Materials Ltd73 Browne-Wilkinson J held that regard should be had to whether 
the document has been drawn to the attention of employees by the employer 
or whether it has been followed without exception for a substantial period.
Another option open to the court is to imply into the contract of 
employment under the “officious bystander test,” for implication of terms, 
although this approach is not often used for handbook terms and works rules.  
The “officious bystander” test was first set out in 1926 in the Court of 
Appeal’s judgment in Shirlaw v. Southern Foundries.  
70 Harvey on Industrial Relations and Employmnet Law (last updated February 2005) 
at [371-375], [hereinafter Harvey].
71 [1940] 1 K.B. 258
72 e.g. in Dryden v. Greater Glasgow Health Board [1992] I.R.L.R. 469 (EAT), 
introducing a no smoking policy. See also Wandsworth Borough Council v. D’Silva 
[1998] I.R.L.R. 193 (CA); Grant v. South West Trains Ltd [1998] I.R.L.R. 188 (QBD) –
broadly stated equal opportunities policy did not have contractual effect.
73 [1996] I.R.L.R. 126
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“Prima facie that which in any contract is left to be implied and need not be 
expressed is something so obvious that it goes without saying, so that if, while 
the parties were making their bargain, an officious bystander were to suggest 
some express provision for it in their agreement they would testily suppress 
him with a common ‘oh, of course.’”74
The English cases on variation of handbook terms often involve 
situations where the handbook has been collectively bargained by a union.  
The general rule is that an employer cannot alter the contract by unilateral 
denunciation of the collective agreement where the relevant terms have 
become part of the contract of employment.75  Likewise, the employee cannot 
unilaterally resile from the terms by mere disagreement with the union,76
although two cases suggest that, if the employee leaves the union 
membership, they may cease to be bound by the collectively bargained 
terms.77
3.2 The operation of the handbook provisions: background norms
The role of handbooks in the English cases are always analysed in the light of 
the employment relationship as a whole, rather than as extraneous contracts.  
74 Shirlaw v. Southern Foundries (1926) Ltd [1939] 2 K.B. 206 per McKinnon L.J. The 
term must also be sufficiently precise, Lister v. Romford Ice and Cold Storage co Ltd 
[1957] A.C. 555 per Viscount Simonds.  The cry of “oh, of course,” must come from 
both parties and not just one of them: Deeley v. British Rail Engineering Ltd [1980] 
I.R.L.R. 147.
75 Cadoux v. Central Regional Council and National Coal board v. National Union of 
Mineworkers, [1986] I.C.R. 736.  See also Harvey at A[336].
76 Tocher v. General Motors Scotland, Ltd [1981] I.R.L.R. 55 (EAT)
77 Singh v. British Steel Corporation [1974] I.R.L.R. 131; Land v. West Yorkshire 
Metropolitan County Council [1981] I.C.R. 334 (CA), although the editors of Harvey 
consider these cases to be incorrectly decided and that the approach of Tocher is to 
be preferred (at A[339]).
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They must therefore be read in light of the rest of the doctrinal considerations 
of the contractual relation.  In England, courts are unlikely to hold that the 
provisions of the handbook are exhaustive of either party’s obligations under 
the contract. 
In Secretary of State for Employment v. ASLEF (No 2)78 the employees of 
British Rail, in protest, instigated a policy of “work to rule” under union 
direction in which they performed only the duties specified in the 
employment handbook to the bare minimum the wording would allow. The 
Court of Appeal for a variety of reasons held unanimously that employees 
who had initiated a “work to rule” were in breach of their employment 
contracts. The reasoning of the three judges in the Court of Appeal is 
particularly interesting as they all have different conceptions of the scope and 
nature of the contract of employment.  
Lord Denning M.R. argued that the work rules did not constitute terms 
in the employment contract. Nevertheless, he held that there is “clearly a 
breach of contract first to construe the rules unreasonably, and then to put 
that unreasonable construction into practice.”79 The lack of a good faith 
motive rendered the employees in breach.80 Roskill L.J, disagreed with Lord 
Denning’s use of subjective motivation in construing the contract and held 
that “questions of intent are usually irrelevant in determining whether or not 
there has been a breach of contract.”81 He held instead that employees may 
78 Supra note 69
79 Id. at 490E-F 
80 Id. at 492
81 Id. at 506
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not rely on an interpretation of the rule which is “wholly unreasonsble.”82 As 
an alternative ground he found that there was an implied term that the 
employee would not seek to interpret the rules such as to disrupt the railway 
system;83 he appears to have used the test of an officious bystander, for terms 
implied in fact rather than in law. Thirdly, Buckley L.J. held that there was an 
implied term “that within the term of the contract the employee must serve 
the employer faithfully with a view to promoting those commercial interests 
for which he is employed.” 84Buckley L.J.’s interpretation, which imports the 
strongest background norm into the contract, is the one which has been 
generally followed by the courts.85  As we will see in the next section, the 
openness of the courts to recognizing that the express terms of the 
employment contract rest on a large residue of legal defaults and principles 
has been a major factor in the development of the implied term of mutual 
trust and confidence.
3.3 Variation of incorporated terms
In the context of a favorable variation of the employee handbook the 
courts have held that the employees continuation of work is sufficient 
consideration for the variation “thereby abandoning any argument that the 
increase should have been even greater, and removing a potential area of 
dispute between the employer and employee.  The employer has both secured 
82 Id. at 507G
83 Id. at 508H
84 Id. at 498G
85 See Ticehurst v. British Telecommunications Plc [1992] I.R.L.R.  219; Cresswell v. 
Board of Inland Revenue [1984] I.R.L.R. 190.
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a benefit and avoided a detriment.”86  Attempts to challenge only variation of 
policies “have not met with great success.”87
Attempts to diminish rights under an employee’s contract are dealt 
with under the “portmanteau” implied term of mutual trust and confidence.88
English law recognizes a number of terms implied by law into the 
employment relationship.89  However, the most important of these is the 
implied term of mutual trust and confidence.
The Honourable Mr Justice Lindsay, a former President of the 
Employment Appeal Tribunal, writing extra judicially,90 notes that one of the 
first recognizable formulations of the implied term of mutual trust and 
confidence was seen in Courtaulds Northern Textiles v. Andrew.91  In this case 
Arnold J approved a formulation of the term proposed by the claimant’s 
lawyers, 
86 Lee v. GEC Plessy Telecommunications [1993] I.R.L.R. 383 (QBD)
87 Harvey supra note 70 at [376] See Dryden v. Greater Glasgow Health Board [1992] 
I.R.L.R. 469 (EAT), Wandswoth London Borough Council v. d’Silva [1998] I.R.L.R. 
193 (CA), Grant v. South West Trains Ltd [1998] I.R.L.R. 188 (QBD) Codes of practice; 
Contract of employment. Uncertain rules: the contractual status of workplace policies. Emp. 
L. Brief. 1998, 5(9), 107-108. 
88 Per Lord Nicholls in Malik v. BCCI [1998] A.C. 20. For example in Woods v. W.M 
car Services (Peterborough Ltd) [1981] I.R.L.R. 347, an employer’s persistent attempts 
to vary an employee’s contract were held to violate this obligation.
89 At common law the UK courts have implied: a duty of the employee of 
cooperation. See R v. Secretary of State for Employment, ex parte ASLEF (No 2) supra
note 69, Cresswell v. Inland Revenue [1984] I.R.L.R. 190); employee’s duty of 
obedience (Laws v. London Chronicle [1958] 1 W.L.R. 698); employee’s duty of 
confidence and fidelity (Hivac v. Park Royal Scientific Instruments Ltd [1946] Ch. 
169); the employer’s duty of cooperation (Woods v. WM Car Services Ltd supra note 
85).  More recently this has been called the implied term of mutual trust and 
confidence (Malik v. BCCI supra note 88). 
90 The Honourable Mr Justice Lindsay, The Implied Term of Mutual Trust and 
Confidence, (2001) 30 I.L.J. 1.
91 [1979] IRLR 84, although several “primative life forms” (Lindsay, id.) are also 
visible in Associated Tyre Specialists v. Waterhouse, [1976] I.R.L.R. 386, and Fyfe v. 
Byrne, [1977] I.R.L.R. 29.  See further Douglas Brodie, Beyond Exchange, the New 
Contract of Employment (1988) 27 I.L.J 79.
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“that the employers would not, without reasonable and proper cause, conduct 
themselves in a manner calculated or likely to destroy or seriously damage the 
relationship of confidence and trust between the parties.”92
In Woods v. W.M Car Ltd93 Browne-Wilkinson J in the EAT approved 
Courtaulds.  He added, “we regard this implied term as one of great 
importance in good industrial relations.”94
Briefly to sum up before we go on, the key in the English cases is 
whether the term in the handbook is incorportated.  D’Silva provides that this 
will be so if the provision, properly so regarded, confers a rights on 
employees rather than doing no more than setting out guidelines as to what is 
expected or required.  Interpretation of a right conferring provision will be 
subject to interpretation in the light of the implied term of mutual trust and 
confidence and will require consideration to flow for variation.
3.4 Other uses of the implied term of mutual trust and confidence
This term implied at law is not just important for the specific duties it imparts, 
but has also been influential in the way in which contracts of employment are 
interpreted.  For example in United Bank v. Akhtar95 the EAT were confronted 
with a term providing that, “the Bank may from time to time require an 
employee to be transferred temporarily or permanently to any place of 
business which the Bank may have in the UK for which a relocation or other 
allowance may be payable at the discretion of the Bank.”  Using the implied 
92 At para 10. Courtaulds, supra note 91.
93 [1981] I.C.R. 666, 670
94 Id., at 671
95 [1988] I.R.L.R. 507
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term of mutual trust and confidence, they held that this could only be 
lawfully exercised if reasonable notice were given and if the discretion as to 
allowances was exercised reasonably.
The question of the strength of the implied obligation of trust and 
confidence was directly considered in Johnstone v. Bloomsbury Area Health 
Authority.96   Although Stuart Smith L.J. held that the implied term of mutual 
trust and confidence superceded the express wording of the contract, the 
other two members of the Court of Appeal held otherwise.  Leggatt L.J. held, 
formalistically, that the implied term cannot have any effect over the express 
terms of the contract.
Browne-Wilkinson V-C’s solution is the more elegant.  He held that 
where the express term includes a contractual discretion this must be read as 
being bounded by the implied term of mutual trust and confidence.  
Although traditional contract scholars consider this to be unconventional,97 it 
is far from so.  This is precisely the approach that the courts take to the 
interpretation of many statutes, presuming them not to violate rule of law 
principles unless clear wording is used.98 As we will consider below,99 given 
the openness of text, the impossibility of an uncontroversial reading purely 
from the language, and the speculativity of deriving true legislative intent, a 
96 [1992] Q.B. 333
97 this suggestion was criticized by Legatt LJ and subsequently by Phang supra note 
15.
98 For an example of this principle in action see Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign 
Compensation Commission [1969] 2 A.C. 147; R. v. Secretary of State for the Home 
Department, ex p. Pierson [1998] A.C.539; R v. A. (Sexual Offence: Complainant’s 
Sexual History) [2001] UKHL 25, [2002] 1 A.C. 45. See also the discussion of these 
cases in T.R.S. Allan, Legislative Supremacy and Legislative Intention: Interpretation, 
Meaning and Authority, (2004) 63 C.L.J. 685.
99 At section 4.2.2.
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presumptive approach is all the court is left with.100  What commentators, such 
as Phang, and Legatt L.J. miss, is that court’s adjudication of contracts 
involves far more than following the intention of the parties. By entering even 
into presumed intention, they are going beyond the simple autonomous will 
of the two parties. This will be considered in greater detail in the next Chapter 
against the backdrop of the US case of Tymshare v. Covell and the English case 
of Mallone v. BPP Industries.101
3.5 Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977
In addition, it is worth noting, in a brief detour, that express terms may be 
avoided under the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977. Under section 3, a party is 
prevented from unreasonably excluding or restricting liability for rendering 
substantially different, or no performance.  Under the test in Brigden, a court 
will make a distinction between exclusion clauses, to which the test of 
reasonableness will then be applied, and provisions “setting out the 
entitlement and limits of his rights.” 102
3.6 Summary of the English position
The English approach is therefore very different to that of the majority of the 
US states.  The relationship is considered as distinctly bilateral.  This does not, 
100 See for example, Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 Harv. L. Rev 863 (1930),; 
Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (1986), 313-354, David L. Shapiro, Continuity and 
Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67 N.Y. U. l. Rev. 921 (1992) accepts this 
assumption; Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation in the Classroom and in the 
Courtroom, 50 U. Chi, L. Rev 800 (1983); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the 
Regulatory State, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 405 (1989)
101 See section 4.2.2.
102 Brigden v. American Express Bank Ltd, [2000] IRLR 94 (QBD)
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however, conclude the analysis.  Given the dominant effect of the implied 
term of mutual trust and confidence on the contract of employment itself the 
most important two questions in the English cases have become: firstly, 
whether the particular term or condition has been “incorporated” into the 
contract of employment; and secondly what the effect of the implied term of 
mutual trust and confidence will have on the recognition and flexibility of 
that term with regard to all of the others in the relationship as a whole.
4. Cross fertilization: the comparative conversation
There are several unexplained issues on both sides of the Atlantic.  One is the 
search for the doctrinal source of the obligation of reasonable notice from 
Asmus. Another relates to the English implied term of mutual trust and 
confidence and how such a broad obligation can satisfy the, usually stringent, 
test for implying terms into contracts.  The analysis in this chapter will aim to 
demonstrate that tools for answering both of these dilemmas can be derived 
from the opposite side of the ocean.  As Atiyah and Summers, writing 
together, note, the English and American systems do have important 
methodological differences in legal reasoning.  This means that any proposal 
for a “legal transplant” must be treated carefully and sensitively.103  However, 
with appropriate sensitivity and care to these factors there are interesting 
lessons to be learned from both systems, which can bring clarity to these two 
confused issues.
103 P.S. Atiyah & Robert S. Summers, Form and Substance, supra note 3, 428-432
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4.1 How can the implied term of mutual trust and confidence have survived 
the test for implication of terms into the contract?
In English Law terms may be implied into contracts in three ways: by 
statute;104 by custom;105 and by operation of law. Terms implied at common 
law fall into two categories, those “implied in fact” and those “implied in 
law.”  We have already considered the officious bystander test of McKinnon 
L.J. in Shirlaw v. Southern Foundries, when considering incorporation of 
handbooks into the contract of employment.106  Another formulation of the 
test is that implication must be “necessary to give the transaction such 
business efficacy as the parties must have intended.”107  If the contract can be 
operative without it, it is not implied into the bargain.   Terms implied in law 
may be implied into contracts of a certain type.  The test for implication 
clearly cannot be the business efficacy/officious bystander test, as this would 
make the implication of the implied term of mutual trust and confidence 
impossible.  
However the distinction between terms implied in fact and those 
implied in law has not been without its critics, for example Andrew Phang 
argues that only the narrow officious bystander test is capable of providing 
104 for example s12-15 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979, s1 of the Equal Pay Act 1970.
105 A custom will be generally implied into a contract if it was generally accepted by 
those doing business in the particular trade, at that place and time and a reasonable 
observer would be able to discover it. Hutton v. Warren, (1836) 1 M & W 466; 
Palgrave, Brown and Sons v. SS Turid (Owners) [1922] 1 A.C. 397.  This is an 
objective test and it is clear it will apply whether or not the parties actually knew of 
the custom or not: Kum v. Wah Tat Bank Ltd [1971] 1 Lloyds Rep 439.  
106 See section 3.1
107 The Moorcock (1889) 14 P.D. 64.  This test was approved by Cardozo J in Wood v. 
Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 222 N.Y. 88, 118 N.E. 214 (1917), although Professor Melvin 
Eisenberg doubts that this test was applied at this full strength in this case; M. A. 
Eisenberg, The Principles of Consideration 67 Cornell L. Rev. 640, 649-51 (1982).
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for the necessary degree of certainty.  He argues that the distinction between 
fact and law, between “the search for an implied term necessary to give 
business efficacy to a particular contract and the search, based on wider 
considerations, for a term which the law will imply as a necessary incident of 
a definable category of contractual relationship”108 is futile. In Scally v. 
Southern Health and Social Services Board, Lord Bridge, however concluded 
that, “the criterion to justify an implication of this kind is necessity, not 
reasonablness.”109
The implied term of mutual trust and confidence would not easily 
have survived the officious bystander test as it is both specified very broadly, 
and it is recognized in a much broader class of contracts than previous 
implication at law cases had held110
Like Leggatt L.J.’s approach to the interpretation of contractual terms 
in Johnstone, the test for the implication of terms in English law is aggressively 
formalistic.  It shows the same symptoms of skepticism of abstract principles, 
or what P.S. Atiyah termed, “explicit theory.”  This brings us to a particular 
peculiarity of English legal reasoning, which will have large ramifications for 
the rest of the analysis. Atiyah is correct when he observes:
“…the truth is that the inclination towards pragmatism, and the aversion to 
theory which I have suggested are the characteristics of the English legal 
system, turn out to be an aversion to explicit theory rather than an aversion to 
all theory. Implicit theories exist all around us in the law and the legal system, 
108 Scally v. Southern Health and Social Services Board [1991] 3 W.L.R. 778, 787 per
Lord Bridge of Harwich [hereinafter Scally]
109Id.  at 779
110 For example in Liverpool City Council v. Irwin [1977] A.C. 239
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sometimes half acknowledged, sometimes understood but not thought suitable 
for discussion, and sometimes probably not appreciated at all. I need hardly 
point out that this reliance on implicit theory does not adequately substitute 
for an avowed willingness to discuss explicit theory. Experience is, in truth, 
no substitute for logic in the appropriate place, a pragmatic emphasis on 
remedies is no adequate substitute for an understanding of the rights which 
those remedies are invoked to protect, the use of precedent without principle 
would render the law a meaningless jumble, and the wholly practical lawyer 
without the assistance of the academic would probably do much the same. And 
implicit theory is no substitute for explicit theory for the obvious reason that it 
is not available for discussion and refutation.”111
This caution towards explicit theory can be seen in the test formulated by the 
courts to imply terms. Where terms cannot be imputed to the parties 
intentions, as in the business efficacy test, the test permits the courts only to 
imply in what is “necessary” rather than what would be reasonable.  This 
encourages the courts to look for the narrowest language, rather than the best 
justification for the term.  This discourages coherence and theoretical 
soundness.
 Patrick Atiyah argued that “the judicial process serves…two main 
functions,” 112 that of individual “dispute settlement,” and what he termed the 
111 Atiyah, Pragmatism and Theory, supra note 20, at 148.
112 Atiyah, Principles to Pragmatism: Changes in the Function of the Judicial Process and the 
Law, 65 Iowa L Rev 1202 (1980).  Also in M.A. Eisebberg, the Nature of the Common 
Law (1988) pp4-7 it is noted that the courts have two businesses, that of decising 
individual disputes, and of enriching our body of legal norms.
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“hortatory function,” the process by which the law produces incentives and 
disincentives for various types of behavior. These two functions, he posits, 
produces a tension between principles and pragmatism.  English lawyers, he 
posits, have a tendency towards embracing pragmatism at the expense of 
theoretical and principled coherence. This produces “serious weaknesses in 
the common law pragmatic tradition, because of the tendency, sometimes 
more and sometimes less pronounced, to concentrate on precedent rather 
than principle.”113
The difference between the hortatory effect of broadly stated 
principles, and precise rules can be seen in the recent case of Crossley v. 
Faithful and Gould Holdings.114  In this case Dyson L.J. acknowledged that the 
test for implication of terms in law is not one of strict “necessity,” but “it is 
better to recognize that, to some extent at least, the existence and scope of 
standardized implied terms raise questions of reasonableness, fairness and 
the balancing of competing policy considerations,”115 although what test he 
does propose is unclear.  This test is better suited to the implication of terms 
such as the implied term of mutual trust and confidence, as it shows a 
willingness by the courts to consider interest balancing, and a move towards 
the embracing of an approach which welcomes more expansive theoretical 
justifications and principles openly into the adjudicative process.  Under the 
former test of necessity, the courts were in denial about the degree to which 
113 Atiyah, Pragmatism and Theory, supra note 20, 125 See also Elizabeth Peden, 
supra note 25, noticed that the strictness of the necessity test can lead to seeming 
incoherence; “when the courts focus too intensely on whether a term is “necessary,” 
rather than relying on broad principles, the results can be unfortunate.”
114 [2004] EWCA Civ 293, [2004] ICR 1615
115 Id.,  at para. 36.
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default rules, prescribed by law, were necessary for the operation of a 
contract.  It belonged to a time of fiction of the agreement as a complete 
“meeting of the minds” of the parties.  The necessity test had also been allied 
to conservative incrementalism116
4.1.1 Adding principled coherence
However, relaxing the strictness of the “necessity” test for implication 
into one which considers “reasonableness and fairness” is not, by itself, 
sufficient to bring principled coherence to English contract law.  As Atiyah 
noted in the passage reproduced above, English courts reluctance to embrace 
explicit theory leads them, instead to rely on implicit theory.  In order for the 
law in this area to be properly understood, however, what is needed is a 
justification for the implication of the implied term of mutual trust and 
confidence which is not married exclusively to the subjective agreement of the 
parties, or a strict incrementalist approach to the court’s role in private law 
adjudication.   What is needed is not just, as Dyson L.J. suggested, an 
approach which appeals to “policy,” but one which also appeals to 
“principle.”
One credible solution lies in the doctrine of good faith, which has been 
developed to a much greater degree over the last century in American 
contract jurisprudence than by the English courts.  This is unsurprising, as 
Professor Atiyah observed that “American legal theory is profoundly 
116 Atiyah, Principles to Pragmatism, supra 112.  For an interesting parallel analysis of 
the development of American legal thought see Duncan Kennedy, the Rise and Fall of 
Classical Legal Thought (1998).
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different to ours,”117 in its openness to principle and theorizing.  In England, in 
Malik v. BCCI, Lord Nicholls recognized that the implied term of mutual trust 
and confidence is a “portmanteau obligation.”118 Although this description is 
clearly true on one level, as the term does operate on the level of individual 
dispute settlement as a generalized suitcase full of specific rights, it is 
misleading in the sense that it does not appeal to the justifying principles 
which drive it.  These implicit moral principles are those of reciprocity and 
good faith.   
Given the breadth of the implied term of mutual trust and confidence, 
it is not surprising that the courts have begun to flirt with the rhetoric of good 
faith in this area.  This is an exciting development as although in 1766 in 
Carter v. Boehm, an insurance case, Lord Mansfield famously referred to good 
faith as “the governing principle…applicable to all contracts and dealings;”119
from the perspective of the end of the twentieth century Farnsworth notes, in 
England “the course of the doctrine of good faith performance has been 
downhill”120 since then.
A few of the UK courts have suggested that the mutual obligation of 
trust and confidence and good faith are in fact synonymous.  The first 
example was in Imperial Group Pension v. Imperial Tobacco,121 where Sir Nicolas 
Browne-Wilkinson V-C in the Chancery Division held that employee 
117 Atiyah, Pragmatism and Theory, supra note 20. At 167
118 Malik v. BCCI, supra note 88, para. 13
119 Carter v. Boehm (1766) 3 Burr 1905, at 1910; 97 ER 1162 at 1164
120 E. Allen Farnsworth, Good Faith in Contract Performance in Good Faith and Fault in 
Contract Law (Beatson & Freidmann eds., 1995) 154, 155 [hereinafter Farnsworth in 
Beatson & Friedman]
121 [1991] 2 All ER 597
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beneficiaries of a company pension scheme were entitled to the protection of 
the implied term of mutual trust and confidence.  Crucially, he equates this 
with “the implied obligation of good faith.”122 Later in the same paragraph the 
Vice Chancellor gives the hypothetical example of where “the company were 
to say, capriciously, that it would consent to an increase in the pension 
benefits of members of union A but not of union B.”  Good faith, in Sir 
Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson’s view, is not a test of “whether the company is 
acting reasonably.123  The duty of good faith is interpreted to require “that the 
company should not exercise its rights for the purpose of coercing that class 
(the closed class of employees) to give up its rights under the existing trust.”124
This terminology was also more recently approved of by Lord Steyn in 
Eastwood v. Magnox125 and has also been spoken of favorably by some 
academic commentators.126
However the UK courts rarely use the terms interchangeably.  This 
seems to be due to several misconceptions about the principle of good faith.  
Firstly, Lindsay J, a former President of the EAT, suggests that judicial 
reluctance is due to the ease of confusing “good faith” with contracts 
“uberrimae fidei,”127 however, it would be a shame if lawyers’ inability to 
distinguish utmost-good-faith, from good faith, was sufficient to prevent 
conceptual coherence within the law.  Secondly, and perhaps more clearly in 
the courts’ mind, there is a deep seated suspicion that good faith is merely a 
122 Id. at 606b
123 Id. at 607b
124 Id. at 607g
125 [2004] 1 W.L.R. 322 
126 See further: Hugh Collins, Regulating the Employment Relationship, [2001] ILJ 17, 37
127 The Honourable Mr Justice Linsday, supra note 90, at 6
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subjective test which would lead to unadministrable uncertatinty.128  Douglas 
Brodie, for example claims that “the practical difference between the 
obligation of good faith and that of mutual trust and confidence would 
appear to lie in that the former is subjective,” whereas the implied term of 
mutual trust and confidence is subjective.129
However, this is a misperception of the essence of good faith both in 
application in individual cases and as a guiding principle.  In the US the 
Courts and commentators, although they are often divided on the true 
meaning of good faith, are almost unanimous in considering that good faith is 
not a purely subjective test.130 However, the US commentators are divided on 
how subjective the test for good faith is.  This does raise grave issues of 
administrability across contract law in general.  However, it will be argued 
later in this chapter that these concerns can be overcome at the level of rule 
application in these fact patterns with the aid of “Situation Sense.”
4.1.2 The English reluctance to embrace principle 
128 In Walford v. Miles, [1992] 2 AC 128, the House of Lords energetically denied that 
there existed a doctrine of good faith in English Law.
129 Douglas Brodie, The Heart of the matter: Mutual Trust and Confidence, 25 ILJ 121, 128 
(1996) .  In Malik v. BCCI, supra note 88, Lord Nicholls held that “the conduct 
required of a breach must…impinge on the relationship in the sense that, looked at 
objectively, it is likely to destroy or seriously damage the degree of trust and 
confidence the employee is reasonably entitled to have in his employer” at para [14], 
my italics.
130 for example, Holdsworth notes that the concept of good faith in the English law of 
merchant “put into legal form the religious and moral ideas which, at this period 
coloured the economic though of all the nations of Europe 
…[therefore]…contributed to enforce those high standard of good faith and fair 
dealing which are the very life of the trade.” 5 Holdsworth, A history of English Law 
79-81 (2d ed.1937). See section 4.3.2.
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Additionally, the reluctance to recognize good faith may also be due to 
the English court’s occasional reluctance to differentiate between principle 
and policy. This links up with Atiyah’s observations that English practising 
lawyers are averse to “explicit theory.”131 Ronald Dworkin famously described 
the distinction as turning on the fact that “arguments of policy justify a 
political decision by showing that the decision advances or protects some 
collective goal of the community as a whole,” whereas arguments from 
principle “secures some individual or group right.”132  This captures one 
aspect of the distinction, but it is also important to notice where this leads.   
Substantially, arguments from policy tend towards the role of the court as a 
settler of individual disputes and are unstructured considerations, arguments 
from principle have a higher aim from the hortatory function. However, as 
Atiyah notes, the court can never safely ignore the hortatory function entirely 
as it exists forever in tension with their role as arbiters of individual disputes.  
Hostility to “explicit theory” becomes blindness to “implicit theory” and lack 
of coherence in policy arguments.
 This can be seen in the way some of the English courts have dealt with 
the typical consequentialist policy argument of “floodgates.”  This particular 
argument, typically raised to combat a newly proposed legal test or an 
implied term, alleges that the new formulation would “open the floodgates” 
to interminable litigation, radical uncertainty and practical chaos.133  It is 
131 See footnote 111.
132 Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (1978), at 82
133 This is the reason why the third limb of the test for whether there is a duty of care 
in English tort law is whether recognition of such a duty contravenes public policy. 
Caparo Industries Plc. v. Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605
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treated, on the surface, as an argument that the rule falls foul of overbreadth.  
Arguments from “floodgates” tend to involve a combination of empirical 
assertions and predictions, and general worries.   One thing this argument 
does not generally appeal to is “principle.”  In the “rag bag” of prudential 
factors mentioned, arguments about hortatory coherence of the law or 
principled methods of analysis are left out.  As some of the English House of 
Lords are increasingly recognizing, arguments from principle appeal to 
something higher than prudential balancing; a counter argument alleging that
the principle is overbroad misses the importance of the hortatory effect of the 
principle.134  This is not to say that prudential concerns, such as are often 
expressed under the heading of “floodgates” are not valid concerns, as they 
clearly are, however, no coherent method is used for assessing their relevance 
or weight.135 Duncan Kennedy notes, at the hortatory level, there is a value in 
showing “orderliness” to the debates which are often framed in terms of 
policy.136 The general reluctance of the English courts to consider the value in 
considering this higher level of ordering, explains a large amount of their 
reluctance to recognize the principle of good faith.  In mistaking it for a “rule” 
they hurl floodgates policy arguments at it.  As will be considered later in this 
chapter, this criticism fundamentally misunderstands the nature of good 
134 See per Lords Steyn and Walker in Chester v Ashfar [2004] UKHL 41
135 An example of the failure of floodgates arguments in practice is in Pepper 
(Inspector of Taxes) v. Hart, [1993] A.C. 593, in which the House of Lords recognized 
that legislative history could be relevant in the interpretation of statutes.  Unlike the 
principled debate in the US, the judgments of the House of Lords seem mostly 
concerned with the prudential policy concern of whether such a holding would 
cause litigation to become more long-winded.
136 Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 Harv. L. Rev 
1685, 1724 [hereinafter Kennedy, Form and Substance].
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faith’s operation as a hortatory principle as well as acting in different fact 
patterns as a specific rule.   
Before we delve into these questions about the nature of good faith, 
however, we must first consider the other question raised in this analysis.
4.2  Where does the “reasonable notice” obligation in variation cases come 
from?
Richard Pratt has argued that “it is grossly unjust to tell an employee 
who has been working for years under such a provision that the handbook 
has suddenly changed.”137 As it was suggested at the end of the second 
chapter, this appeal to fairness seems to be intuitively correct. Policy reasons 
against the Govier- esque analysis were clearly felt, by the courts in Bankey and 
Asmus, as they require reasonable notice of a unilateral variation.  However, 
the legal basis of this obligation is somewhat unclear. On the analysis in 
Asmus, the right to vary a separate unilateral contract without the need for 
consideration to flow is an automatic consequence of its nature as unilateral.  
However, if this is the case, there seems to be little basis for requiring any 
notice, reasonable or not. In at-will contracts, for instance, the essence is that 
they are terminable without reasonable notice Although the majority of 
employment handbook variation cases are not at-will contracts, at least prior 
137 Richard J. Pratt, supra note 34, at 224.  Stephen Carey Sullivan also advocates use 
of the bilateral analysis in, Unilateral Modification of Employee Handbooks: A 
Contractual Analysis, 5 Regent U. L. Rev. 261 (1995)
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to the variation, the reasonable notice requirement cannot be part and parcel 
of the fact that the contracts are unilateral.  
In Bankey, the court put a large degree of emphasis on the “legitimate 
expectations” of the employer. However, invocation of legitimate 
expectations on their own can reduce to a circular appeal to policy as an 
expectation of reasonable notice will only be legitimate if the law regards it as 
subject to entitlement.138 The “legitimate expectations” analysis does, however, 
appeal to a recognition of the employment relationship as an ongoing one. 
However this reasoning has mainly been eschewed by courts, who seem to 
prefer instead the “traditional”139 contractual analysis.140
Although Toussaint was not a variation case, its characterization of the 
relationship as one resting on legitimate expectations does appeal to the 
relationship of the parties as a foundation for the obligation.  This inquiry is 
on more fertile ground than the arid search for whether the handbook is a 
unilateral or bilateral contract separate from the contract of employment. It is 
important because it notices a counter current to the strongly employer 
favoring rhetoric of the at-will presumption.  Recognition of certain 
expectations as legitimate is therefore a rhetorical tool for referring to deeper 
justifications for the ruling.
138 This is central to the reasoning of cases in the European Court of Justice under the 
doctrine of legitimate expectations. See Joined Cases 205/82 to 215/82 Deutsche 
Milchkontor [1983] ECR 2633; and Joined Cases T-116/01 and T-118/01 P & O 
European Ferries (Vizcaya) and Diputación Foral de Vizcaya v. Commission [2003] ECR II-
2957.  This is also a precondition of an action for legitimate expectations in England 
too; see further Simon P. Atrill, The End of Estoppel in Public Law? C.L.J. 2003, 62(1), 
3
139 See Kohn supra note 34.
140 E.g. in Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Campbell, 512 So.2d 725, 730 (Ala. 1987) the 
Alabama Supreme Court, although holding the Toussaint approach to be “well 
reasoned and logical” used the unilateral contractual analysis, in preference.
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Once the invocation of “legitimate expectations” is viewed at the level 
of justificatory rhetoric it begins to sound similar to the courts’ invocation of 
“good faith.” The need to avoid bad faith is also referred to by the courts in 
both Govier and Bankey.  The language of good faith is a familiar doctrinal tool 
of the US courts in contract cases, contained within the Restatement (Second) 
of Contracts and regularly applied in commercial contracts as it is included 
within the UCC.
4.2.1 The case for explicit recognition of a doctrine of good faith variation 
in employment contracts.
The policy justifications for recognizing a rule requiring at least 
reasonable notice have already been considered at the end of the second 
chapter.  There are also several compelling reasons why the doctrine of good 
faith should be invoked more freely by the courts as the underlying rationale 
for imposing these obligations on the employer.
Not only does good faith give a doctrinal basis for regulating the 
variation of employee handbooks, its explicit recognition also adds coherence 
to the area of law as a whole. It appeals to the relationship as one of 
mutuality, where the employer’s ongoing control over the employee is 
tempered by an obligation to exercise that control in good faith.  As we have 
seen, in England the implied term of mutual trust and confidence grew up as 
a term of symmetricality with the employees duties of loyalty and 
cooperation to the employer.  In return for faithful service, the employer 
exercises control over the employee, which must be exercised in a manner, 
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which does not destroy the relationship of mutual trust and confidence 
between the parties.  US law clearly recognizes one half of the obligations in 
this relationship, that of the employer’s control; for example, this used as the 
central test for distinguishing between employees and independent 
contractors.141
4.2.2 Good faith interpretation
Secondly, recognition of the principle of good faith in one area of the 
regulation of the employment contract, it can also unify it with another.  As 
we saw in Johnstone, good faith can play an important role in the 
interpretation of contracts. This can be seen on the facts of the US case of 
Tymshare v. Covell, where an employer attempted to make use of a broad 
discretionary power in bad faith to deprive an employee commission sales 
representitive of a benefit.142 In 1980 Covell’s sale quota was set at $1.2million 
in the expectation that it would be a successful year.  However, problems 
ensued and Tymshare reduced Covell’s quota to $815,000 in Spring 1980.  
Covell’s projected earnings, were therefore approximately $31,000.  In the fall, 
however, business boomed and Covell’s commissions bloomed.  In 
December, before Covell had been paid his newly earned commission, 
141 See Mitzner v. State, 891 P.2d 435 (Kan.1995), Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp. 120 F.3d 
1006 (9th cir.1997), cert denied, 522 U.S. 1098 (1998). Although courts consider various 
factors to be relevant to the issue, Mortgage Consultants v. Mahoney, 655 N. E. 2d 
493, 496 (Ind. 1995) existence of employer control is seen as one of the most 
important criteria, Hunte v. Blumenthal, 680 A. 2d. 1231 (Conn, 1996), Kristianson 
Flying J Oil & Gas, Inc., 553 N.W. 2d 186 (N.D. 1996); Dewater v. State, 921 P.2d 1059  
(Wash, 1996).
142 727 F 2d 1145 (1984) [hereinafter Tymshare]. Also see Locke v. Warner Bros., Inc., 57 
Cal. App. 4th 354, 66 call. Rptr.2d 921 (1997)
55
Tymshare produced a revised quota plan in order to eliminate the increase.  
Covell’s employment was terminated on December 20th.   Covell claimed that 
the discretion under the plan had not been exercised in good faith, contrary to 
Virginia law.  As his accounts included contracts with the United States Postal 
Service the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that they had 
jurisdiction under the District of Columbia to hear the case.  This quirk of 
factual circumstances permitted Circuit Judge Scalia, as he then was, to write 
an academically dense judgment.143
He agrees explicitly both with Professor Summers and Farnsworth’s 
accounts of good faith, (which will be discussed further below).  Taking these 
two together he argues that “when these two insights are combined, it 
becomes clear that the doctrine of good faith performance is a means of 
finding within a contract an implied obligation not to engage in the particular 
form of conduct which, in the case at hand constitutes “bad faith.”   He sees 
this as consistent with the principle of “honoring the reasonable expectations 
created by the autonomous expressions of the contracting parties” although 
“the new formulation may have more appeal to modern taste since it purports 
to rely directly upon considerations of morality and public policy.”  
Interestingly, he uses the principle of good faith as a technique of 
contractual interpretation.  Tymshare had argued that their contractual 
143 Scalia J. cites Steven Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform 
in Good Faith, 94 Harv L Rev 369 (1980) [hereinafter Common Law Duty], Robert R. 
Summers, Good Faith in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform 
Commercial Code, supra, note 28, E. Allan Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance and 
Commercial Reasonableness under the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U. Chi. L. Rev. 666 
(1963) [herinafter Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance] in the main text of the 
judgment, rather than in footnotes.
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discretion permitted them to alter the benefit scheme in this way.  However 
Circuit Judge Scalia held that this interpretation would “require such a degree 
of folly on the part of these sales representatives we are not inclined to posit 
where another plausible interpretation of the language is available.”144  The 
contract cannot be interpreted such as to take away the benefits which the 
employee has bargained for.  This is similar to the formulation of good faith 
set out in the old case of Kirke La Shelle v. Paul Armstrong Co that:
“in every contract there is an implied covenant that neither party shall do 
anything which will have the effect of destroying or injuring the right of the 
other party to receive the fruits of the contract, which means that in every 
contract there exists an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.'145
Not only ins the formulation of good faith in Kirke la Shelle very similar 
to the formulation of the EAT in Courtaulds Northern Textiles v. Andrew,146that 
an employer must not act so as to destroy the relationship of mutual trust and 
confidence, but Circuit Judge Scalia’s application of these principles to the 
case is very similar to that taken recently in the English case of Mallone v. BPP 
Industries.147
Mallone was an executive of BPP’s Italian subsidiary until 1995.  His 
contract contained an executive share option scheme.  However, when he was 
144 Tymshare, supra note 142 , 1154
145 188 N.E. 163, 167 (NY 1933). Although this case was not cited directly by Scalia J in 
the judgment. He chooses instead to prefer that parties reasonable expectations are 
honoured (at 1152).  See also Uproar Co. v. National Broadcasting Co., 81 F.2d 373, 
377 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 670 (1936), Druker v. Roland Wm. Jutras Assocs., 
370 Mass. 383, 385 (1976). Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 231 (Tent. Drafts Nos. 
1-7 (1973). 5 S. Williston, Contracts § 670 (3d ed. 1961).
146 Supra note 91.
147 [2002] EWCA Civ 126, [2002] I.C.R. 1045
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dismissed in 1995, BPP informed him that his share option was zero.  At trial 
Christopher Symons Q.C., sitting as a deputy High Court Judge, held that the 
contractual discretion under the employment contract did not entitle them to 
cancel the option scheme once it had been held for three years. In the Court of 
Appeal Mr Mallone’s counsel argued that the directors’ discretion was not 
exercised in “good faith.” Rix L.J. held for the court that the contractual 
language could “in theory embrace an exercise of the directors’ discretion in 
relation to mature as well as immature options.”  However, he then went on 
to consider whether the exercise of the discretion was “irrational.”   In Clark v. 
Nomura,148 Burton J. had held that employer’s discretions are “not 
unfettered…a simple discretion whether to award a bonus must not be 
exercised capriciously.”  This, he equated, with a test of “irrationality or 
perversity” borrowed from the Administrative law context, “whether any 
reasonable employer could have come to that conclusion.” As in this case, 
“there is no sign any regard was had to the fact the options were clearly 
granted at a time when Mr Mallone’s performance was clearly regarded as 
excellent….I have no difficultly in saying that the judge was entitled to find 
that the committee’s decision was one which no reasonable employer could 
have reached.”
Although Rix L.J. never sounds entirely comfortable with the term 
“good faith,” using it only twice in his judgment; preferring to consider 
specific types of dishonesty, improper purpose or arbitrariness, they are 
clearly talking of virtually indistinguishable tests. 
148 [2000] I.R.L.R. 766 at para. 40
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Neither of these is an instance of the use of contra proferentum 
construction.
In 1994 Professor, now the Honourable Mr Justice, Jack Beatson wrote 
that “Contract law…has not been influenced by public law principles or by 
the rules of statutory regulatory regimes.”149 However, were he to write the 
same article now, after Mallone, he could no longer claim this to be the case.  
The analogy to administrative law is interesting, and one which links 
up well with the approach of Scalia J in Tymshare.  In Tymshare, some of Scalia 
C.J.’s language could be mistaken for that of an administrative law judgment.  
For example he states that , “the language need not…be read to confer 
discretion to reduce the quota for any reason.”150 The contract is treated as an 
autonomous document, which has “purpose implicitly envisioned” in it.151
However, we must consider whether it is wise for a theory of the 
interpretation of contracts to borrow a theory of statutory interpretation? 
Attempts to borrow theories in the opposite direction have rarely been 
uncontroversial.152 Statutory interpretation involves more problematic 
questions of divining legislative intention than contractual interpretation, as a 
statute is the product of the entire legislative process, and the work of many 
minds.  Ronald Dworkin persuasively argues that a theory of statutory 
interpretation cannot be “conversational;” a search for the subjective state of 
mind of the legislature is both doomed to failure and inconclusive.  He points 
149 Jack Beatson, Public Law Influences in Contract Law in Good Faith and Fault in 
Contract Law (Beatson & Friedmann eds, 1995), 265, 288.
150 Tymshare, supra note 142, at 1145
151 Tymshare, supra  note 142 at 1155
152 See further Mark L. Movsesian, Are Statutes Really “Legislative Bargains”?  The 
Failure of the Contract Analogy in Statutory Interpretation, 76 N.C.L. Rev. 1145.
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to the problems facing an intentionalist judge in determining who the true 
authors of a statute are, how they combine together, and whether their mental 
state is relevant beyond their expressions in the wording of the statutes.153
He echoes Max Radin’s pessimism that “the intention of the legislature is 
undiscoverable.”154
Contracts, on the other hand have far fewer of these particular 
problems.  They tend not to be the product of so many minds.  The law 
repeatedly asserts that freedom of contract means freedom for the parties to 
contract for whatever they subjectively intend.  However, even though the 
law grants this freedom, this does not necessarily mean that parties have 
exhaustively exercised it.  If, as in the case of a discretion, the limits to which 
the parties have bound themselves are unclear, we are not dealing with a 
question of limiting “freedom of contract,” as the parties have not committed 
themselves either way.  Although it may initially seem that Dworkin’s 
conception of “conversational interpretation” is of most relevance to the 
interpretation of contracts, the similarities between contract and statutes 
become clearer and it appears that constructive interpretation is more suitable 
as a technique, given the creation of the “contract” as a separate entity to the 
“conversational” negotiations. The language of administrative statutory 
interpretation, therefore, seems to be particularly apt in this case. Its 
congruence with the principle of good faith is clear.155
153 Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire, (1986) 313-355.
154 Max Radin, supra note 100, at 870.
155 For a very interesting article arguing in the opposite direction, that the relaxed 
approach to the parol evidence rule should be used to support the argument in favor 
of using legislative history in interpreting statutes see: Stephen F. Ross & Daniel 
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4.2.3 Alternatives 
After considering the case for evaluating good faith as a doctrinal basis for the 
reasonable notice criterion we must consider some of the other options which 
have already been suggested.  A note, by Brian T. Kohn, argues for an
ingenious solution.  He suggests that “courts should imply into all 
unilaterally adopted employee policies a subsidiary promise by the employer 
not to modify that policy.”156   He refers to a term implied in law recognized 
by the Californian Supreme Court in Drennan v. Star Paving Co,157 in the 
context of a contractor relying on a subcontractor’s bid in preparing its own.  
He notes that this has been used once in the employment pension context by 
the Oregon Supreme Court to imply a subsidiary contract not to revoke a 
unilateral offer of a retirement plan.158 He argues that, as the courts have had 
no reluctance in implying terms in to the contract favoring the employer,159
there is no legal impediment to them implying a subsidiary promise not to 
vary into the contract too. 
Kohn is on promising ground by looking to implied terms to solve this 
problem.  However, this proposal runs into several potential pitfalls by 
relying on cross fertilization between areas of law, without deriving it from an 
overarching principle.   To use the terminology of Karl Llewellyn, Kohn’s 
Tranen, The Modern Parol Evidence Rule and Its Implications for New Textualist Statutory 
Interpretation, 87 Geo. L.J. 195.
156 Kohn, supra note 34, at 843.
157 333 P.2d 757 (Cal. 1958)
158 Taylor v. Multnomah County Deputy Sheriff’s Retirement Board 510 P2d. 339 (0r 
1973)
159 For example, the Colorado Court of Appeals, in Ferrara v. Nielson 799 P.2d 458 
(Colo. Ct. App. 1990).
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proposal is open to attack from situation sense. Kohn attempts to borrow a 
term across different fact patterns only by analogy.  Analogous references are 
most successful across fact patterns which are as similar as possible. This type 
of reasoning is open to the attack that another term is instead more suitable 
from a nearer fact pattern.  As in Ferrara, a court could instead import an 
alternative formulation of the at-will presumption.  This is a condition
transported from a closer fact pattern than Kohn’s analogies to bids and the 
early pension case.  
However Kohn’s suggestion gains weight if we counter that argument 
with one which goes one step deeper, and appeal to a principled theoretical 
basis for implying such options in to the contract.  This is where the principle 
of good faith can play its role. 
A similar suggestion is offered by Jason Walters.160  He argues that 
handbooks in at-will contracts can be modified at any time as the offer by the 
employer of employment may be terminated at any time.  As unilateral offers 
cannot be revoked when performance is continuing he argues that in at-will 
contracts the employer may determine at any time that performance is 
complete.  Where a handbook term, however, gives assurances to job security, 
however, the situation is different.  He argues that, in this situation, 
performance cannot be deemed complete simply at the whim of either party, 
therefore the terms of the offer of employment may not be revoked or altered 
while the employee is still performing the contract.  
160 Jason A. Walters, The Brooklyn Bridge is Falling Down: Unilateral Contract 
Modification and the Sole Requirement of the Offeree’s Assent, 32 Cumb. L. Rev. 375
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There are several problems with this analysis.  Firstly it is premised on 
the idea that contracts of employment must be unilateral contracts.  The 
necessity for this is far from clear.  As there is clearly an exchange of promises 
when the contract is formed, it could just as easily be analysed as a bilateral 
contract.  Given the mutuality of obligations on both parties in the contract it 
is more appealing to analyse the contract of employment on bilateral 
principles.  Only where a bilateral exchange of promises does not take place 
should unilateral contract analysis be applied.161
However, even assuming that unilateral contract analysis is 
appropriate in these situations, Walters’ conclusions do not flow as simply 
from his premises as he suggests.  His claim that, in an at-will contract, an 
employer may deem performance complete at any time, therefore may 
extinguish the obligations at any time is undoubtably true.  However, it is too 
formalistic to assume that an attempted variation is functionally the same as a 
termination.  Although the end result of a successful variation will be a 
variation in the terms of the initial offer, it is too rigid to maintain that a 
termination has taken place at the moment of variation.  For example, time 
accrued under the Family and Medical Leave Act 1993 (which requires a 
worker to have been employed for at least twelve months and have at least 1, 
250 hours of service in the twelve month period preceding leave) would be 
161 See further on the case for bilateral analysis of employee handbook cases: Richard 
J. Pratt, Comment, Unilateral Modification of Employment Handbooks: Further 
Encroachments on the Employment At-Will Doctrine, 139 U. Pa. L. Rev. 197 (1990).
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most unlikely to be held to be interrupted by a variation of the other terms of 
employment during that time.162
There are clear differences between variation and termination, which 
have been suggested in Chapter 2 and will be analysed further in Chapter 4 of
this paper. Because of this, Walters’ contention that the employer may deem 
performance to be adequate is not of itself sufficient to demonstrate that the 
employer should be permitted to vary the contract unilaterally, at any time 
and without notice.
4.3 If both are explainable by good faith, what does good faith mean?
We have repeatedly been colliding with the question of the meaning of 
good faith means in the various fact patterns of the preceding analysis.  
However, before progressing any further, the time has come to consider the 
broader question of what good faith, may mean in general. However, 
although the question sounds as though it is simple, the answer is likely not 
to be. As Professor Farnsworth has noted, “if, as Professor Goode suggests, 
the English have difficulty in attaching any meaning to good faith, the 
difficulty in my country is quite the opposite: the Americans have, or so it 
might seem, too many meanings of good faith.”163 Before turning to the issue 
of how best to conceptualise good faith, however, it is helpful to consider a  
brief general overview of how “good faith” fits into US law.
4.3.1 Good faith in US law
162 Family and Medical Leave Act 1993 29 U.S.C.A. § 2611 (2).
163 Farnsworth in Beatson & Friedman supra note 120, at 161
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Lawyers in the US are no strangers to the invocation of  “good faith.”  
The classic formulation of good faith is from the 1933 case of Kirke La Shelle 
Co., v. Paul Armstrong Co., has already been considered. This provides that 
parties are precuded by the doctrine of doing anything “which will have the 
effect of destroying or injuring the right of the other party to receive the fruits 
of the contract.164
The U.C.C., which applies to commercial contracts, and not to contracts 
of service, a general duty such that:
“Every contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation of good faith in 
its performance or enforcement.” Section 1-203.
There are two standards specifying the duty of good faith, which seem to 
offer slightly different conceptions of the provision.  Section 1-201(19) defines 
good faith as “honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned,” 
whereas Section 2-103 (1) (b), which applied only to contracts of sale, good 
faith is defined as “honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable 
commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade.”  The second definition 
explicitly recognizes an objective element, in addition to a consideration of the 
subjective motivation of the parties.165  The Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
recognizes that good faith “excludes a variety of types of conduct 
164 Kirke La Shelle, supra note 145.
165 A theory as to why these two provisions differ is provided by Allen R. Kamp, 
Downtown Code, A History of the Uniform Commercial Code: 1949-1954, 49 Buff. L. 
Rev. 359 (2001); Allen R. Kamp, Uptown Act: A History of the Uniform Commercial Code: 
1940-1949, 51 S.M.U.L. Rev.275 (1998)
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characterized as involving ‘bad faith’ because they violate community 
standards of decency, fairness or reasonableness.”166
4.3.2 Academic debate over good faith
However, commentators in the US have been debating the meaning of 
“good faith” for over fifty years.  As Robert S. Summers noted, “general 
definitions of good faith either spiral into the Charybdis of vacuous generality 
or collide with the Scylla or restrictive specificity.”167 In the search for a 
“meaning” for good faith, however, many of the commentators have strayed 
far from the reason for adopting the principle in the first place.
Professor Farnsworth has argued that, in good faith performance, 
“good faith has nothing to do with a state of mind – with innocence, suspicion 
or notice.  Here the inquiry goes to decency, fairness or reasonableness.”  The 
“chief utility of the concept of good faith performance has always been as a 
rationale in a process …that of implying terms.”168  The doctrine of good faith 
results in “an implied term of the contract requiring cooperation on the part 
of one party to the contract is that another party will not be deprived of his 
reasonable expectations.”169
In 1968 Robert S. Summers published a highly influential article, which 
claimed that “good faith” must be defined negatively.  He argued that “in 
contract law, taken as a whole, good faith is an “excluder;” “it is a phrase 
without general meaning (or meanings) of its own and serves to exclude a 
166 Restatement (Second) of Contracts §205, Cmts., A and D.
167 Summers, supra note 28 at 202
168 Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance, supra note 143, at 672
169 Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance, id. at 669
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wide range of heterogeneous forms of bad faith.” 170   A focus on defining the 
positive content of good faith from the case-law is therefore doomed to be 
more difficult as “the typical judge who uses this phrase is primarily 
concerned with ruling out specific conduct, and only secondarily, or not at all, 
with formulating the positive content of a standard.”171
Justice John Priestly JA in the Supreme Court of New South Wales in 
Renard Constructions (ME) Pty Ltd v. Minister for Public Works,172 described 
Summers’ approach as having “the great merit of being workable, without 
involving the use of fictions often resorted to by the courts where the good 
faith obligation is not available, and reflects what actually happens in decision 
making. Just as Lord Nicholls described the obligation of mutual trust and 
confidence as a “portmanteau,” this is a very traditional English/ 
Commonwealth Common law way of embracing good faith in that it stresses 
the pragmatic over the principled.  It is not surprising that Judge Priestly 
finds that looking at the individual concrete instances of good faith can be a 
useful tool in deciding when to apply it to cases.  
However, the interesting question, if Summers’ analysis is to be 
accepted, is whether anything in particular unites these separate instances 
under the principle of good faith at all.173 Summers does offer a general 
conceptualization;
170 Summers, supra note 28, at 201.
171 Id. at 202
172 (1992) 26 N.S.W.L.R. 234 at 266G
173 Yael Aridor Bar Ilan, The Good Faith Puzzle, (May 2002) (unpublished manuscript, 
submitted as an LL.M paper, Harvard University) (On file at Harvard Law School 
Langdell Law Library) at 20.
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“In most cases the party acting in bad faith frustrates the justified 
expectations of another…the ways in which he may do this are numerous and 
radically diverse.”174
This sounds similar to the Court’s invocation of legitimate expectations of the 
parties in Toussaint and Bankey.  However, a crucial issue with a justification 
based on expectations is which particular expectations will be regarded as 
legitimate.   
This is a particularly important factor to consider with regard Steven 
Burton’s analysis of good faith.  He suggests that the doctrine of good faith is 
premised on the need to enforce the justifiable expectations of the parties 
when the contract was formed.175  Burton’s theory has the advantage of 
explicitly resting on the recognition that contracts are incomplete ex ante.176
Even contractual discretions are naturally incomplete.  The obligation of good 
faith, therefore operates as a “gap filler.” A party ‘performs in bad faith by 
using discretion in performance for reasons outside the justified expectations 
of the parties arising from their agreement.”177
It might initially seem that there is little to tell between Burton and 
Summers, as both ultimately rely on the expectations of the parties.  However 
Summers and Burton clearly considered themselves to be in disagreement.178
174 Summers, supra note 28 at 262-3 
175 Steven Burton, Common Law Duty supra note 143
176Id., 371
177 Steven Burton, Contractual Good Faith (1995), p62
178 See further Summers, The General Duty of Good Faith and its Conceptualisation, 67 
Cornell L. Rev. 810 (1982) [hereinafter Summers, Conceptualisation], Burton & 
Anderson, Contractual Good Faith (1995) 406 et cetera.
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One of the crucial aspects of disagreement is over the relevant timing of the 
expectations. Burton’s stress is upon the moment of contracting. He argued 
that “bad faith performance occurs precisely when discretion is use to 
recapture opportunities forgone upon contracting.”179  Although Summers is 
not entirely clear on this point, his concept of good faith involves taking into 
account expectations and hopes formed after the initial moment of contract 
formation.  One way of understanding this conception is that good faith 
legitimates expectations ex post, rather than recapturing those formed ex 
ante.  Summer’s reference to “justified expectations” is rather unfortunate in 
that it seems to suggest that the expectations are justified at the moment when 
they are formed rather than deemed to be so later in the life of the dispute.
Burton also characterizes Summers as advocating an approach which 
appeals to morality, rather than to the agreement of the parties.  However, 
Burton rather overestimates the “agreement” between the parties.  As in the 
interpretation of statutes which we considered above, the search for complete 
“intended meaning” is often as futile as resorting to palmistry. As with 
legislative intent “we have no means of knowing that content except by the 
external utterances or behaviour,”180 but more often than not the exact issue in 
question has not had any direct thought put to it at all.  As Ronald Dworkin 
notes, we can attempt to glean presumed intention by engaging in elaborate 
counterfactualising; what would X have thought had they thought about it.  
However, this kind of question also spirals off into wild speculation.181
179 Steven Burton, Contractual Good Faith  (1995) at 373
180Id., 870-1 
181 Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire, (1986), 325-7.
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A common answer to this problem in the area of statutory 
interpretation is to invoke a presumption of rationality and good faith of the 
legislature.182  If we resolve questions about the interpretation of contracts by 
presuming good faith, we are appealing to a long standing tradition.   
However, the courts on both sides of the Atlantic are still wedded to the 
conception of the contract as the “meeting of minds.” Both in the 
interpretation of contracts and the implication of terms this is not the case.  
Mark Freedland explains the reluctance of the courts in implying terms which 
also goes for interpretation: 
“when the process of ascertainment of implied terms actually involves creative 
law making, the real difficulty presents itself that the courts and tribunals are 
reluctant to evolve positive rationales for that creative law making because 
they are committed to disclaiming the creative law-making role.”183
Burton is therefore mistaken in referring to the subjective expectations 
of the parties before the formation of the contract.  As Todd Rakoff has noted, 
the language of “intention” and “intended meaning” in contract is a 
“ceremonial bow” to private autonomy “answering the needs of ideological 
justification rather than a realistic description.”184  A system which requires 
such obsequious devotion to a fiction, at the expense of principled coherence, 
is storing up trouble for any future developments.
182 See note 98.  For example of this approach in the U.S. see  H. Hart & A. Sachs, The 
Legal Process Materials (W. Eskridge. Jr & P. Frickey eds. 1994), a similar suggestion, 
although one which is arguably stronger has recently been made in the UK by T.R.S. 
Allan, supra note 98.
183 Mark Freedland, The Personal Employment Contract (2003), 124.
184 Todd D. Rakoff, The Implied Terms of Contracts: Of ‘Default Rules’ and ‘Situation 
Sense,’ supra note 23 at 192.
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4.3.3. The several faces of good faith: a return to Llewellyn
It is helpful to go back, for a moment, to the founding father of the 
UCC, Karl Llewellyn.  Llewellyn’s influential work in the 1930s, like Max 
Radin’s, had been distinctly within the legal realist movement.185 One of the 
tenets of this movement, he recognized as “the distrust of verbally simple 
rules.”186 In his early work he advocated “the worthwhileness of grouping 
cases and legal situations into narrower categories than has been the practice 
in the past,” as deductive reasoning from abstract general legal concepts was 
doomed to indeterminacy and failure. This approach seems to be distinctly at 
the “dispute settlement” end of Atiyah’s tension.  Even in his later work, 
where he eschews the realist “dirges” in favour of “situation sense,”187 he 
remains wedded to a pragmatic commitment to “type-facts in their context.” 
What is someone who distrusts “verbally simple rules” and ascribes to such 
fact dependent pragmatism doing advocating a principle as abstract as that of
“good faith and fair dealing” within the UCC?   The key to this question 
appears to be what he considered to be the purpose good rule making:
“The way to write good law is to indicate what you want to do, and you 
assume within reason that the persons the law deals with will try to be decent; 
then after that, you lay down the edges to take care of the dirty guys and try to 
hold them in, which means that every statute ought to have two essential 
185 For example Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism, 44 Harv. L. Rev. 1222 
(1931); Karl Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence – The Next Step, 30 Colum. L. Rev. 431 
(1930).
186 Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism, supra note 185.
187 Karl N. Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals (1960).
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bases, one to show where the law wants you to go, and one to show where we 
will put you if you don’t.”188
He criticizes lawyers for focusing only on the second sense of rule making. As 
these two facets of the law are inevitable, we should celebrate the functions of 
good faith in the first sense of Llewellyn’s distinction. We can see this 
function in practice, in its usage as an interpretative tool in the construction of 
contracts. Llewellyn’s second sense is more consonant with Summers’ 
excluder analysis; the doctrine of good faith can also be used to prescribe 
“dirty” conduct, for example in this situation, the immediate variation and 
depriving of rights in employee handbooks. Read in this manner good faith is 
fully consistent with requirements of situation sense.   
In an interesting comparative work on legal reasoning in the US and 
UK, Summers189 and Atiyah writing in tandem conclude that the formulation 
of good faith is a “principle.”190 Such principles “generate highly substantive 
reasons…upon which private persons may act in the conduct of their 
ordinary affairs.”191 They concede that such principles conflict.  It is in 
instances of conflict that the legal system comes to recognize such principles 
as law.  On recognition as such it becomes, not only a substantive reason, but 
a formal reason, but only in that fact pattern.  They note that “there can be 
little doubt that lawmakers, judges and other officials in the American system 
resort far more often to such principles directly and indirectly, as forms of valid 
188 Karl Llewellyn, Why a Commercial Code (1953) 22 Tenn L. Rev. 779, 782.
189 This is the same Summers as proposed the excluder analysis.
190 P.S. Atiyah & Robert S. Summers, Form and Substance supra note 3.
191 Atiyah and Summers, Form and Substance, supra note 3 at 94.
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law, than is true in the English system.”192 Although he is often though of as a 
pragmatist, there is ample space for principle in Llewellyn’s theory. This is 
demonstrated by one of his most elegant passages on statutory interpretation
“a court must strive to make sense as a whole out of our law as a whole.  It 
must…take the music of any statute as written by the legislature…but there 
are many ways to play that music, and a court’s duty is to play it well and in 
harmony with the other music of the legal system.”193
This another moment where we can see that the English court’s 
treatment of “floodgates” arguments against good faith miss the point of 
principle.  As principles are able to generate and justify substantive reasons 
for certain substantive or procedural outcomes, rather than just prudential 
considerations and narrow defining terms they are not just operating simply 
at the level of rule application. Although, in the individual dispute the parties 
will have arguments mainly of policy concerning their fact pattern, arguments 
of principle cannot be ignored for hortatory purposes of the common law 
method.
A situation sense reading can also allay some of the fears of 
unadministrability of so broad a standard as good faith.   If Summers is 
correct, and at the level of rule application good faith does operate as an 
excluder to prevent various specific types of bad faith conduct, there may be 
192 Atiyah and Summers, Form and Substance, supra note 3, at 94.
193 Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decisions and the Rules of 
Canons About How Statutes are to be Construed, 3 Vand. L. Rev 395 (1950), 399.
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certainty about the operation of good faith in that particular fact pattern.  This 
paper is considering two particular fact patters, that of variation of handbook 
terms, and that of interpretation of the express terms of the contract of 
employment.  In these fact patterns the implied term of mutual trust and 
confidence has not proved to be excessively unadministrable and has been 
mostly well received.194
This situation sensitive analysis will be crucial to the argument in the 
next chapter that at-will and good faith variation can survive side by side.
194 See further, The Honourable Mr Justice Lindsay, The Implied Term of Mutual Trust 
and Confidence, supra note 90.
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5. Interrelations with at-will: a route through the tensions
The argument in this Chapter will suggest that, although at the level of 
principles at-will appears to be moving along a different vector from that of 
good faith performance, the proposed development, need not substantively 
change the scope of the at-will rule.  It will only limit the “at-will principle.”  
The at-will rule in the US has come under a barrage of criticism for 
decades.195  In the 1980s, one state, Montana, enacted legislation providing for 
a statutory remedy to unfair dismissal.196 Some states also have developed an 
exception to at-will based on good faith.197 However, since then, no other state 
has followed suit, and the courts have increasingly become less willing to 
develop common law exceptions to the rule.   It would therefore be 
reasonable to assume that the courts are committed to the survival of this rule 
for the foreseeable future; therefore if recognition of a good faith restriction on 
variation would practically eliminate it, the courts would be much less 
inclined to recognize reasonable notice in variation as an instance of this 
doctrine.  This chapter argues that good faith in variation does not eliminate 
the rule of at-will presumption in employment contracts.  To do this, 
however, it must proceed first set out why this might be a problem.  
195 For example see note 5; in particular Clyde W. Summers, Individual Protection 
Against Unjust Dismissal; time for a Statute, 62 Va. L. Rev 481 (1976
196 Mont. Code Ann. §21-7-221 (2003).
197 for example,  Somers v. Somers, 613 A.2d 1211 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992); Trent Partners 
and Assoc., Inc. v. Digital Equipment Corp., 120 f. Supp. 2d 84 (D. Mass. 1999); 
Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 364 N.E. 2d 1251 (Mass, 177); E. I. Dupont de 
Nemours & co. v. Pressman, 679 A. 2d 436 (Del. 1996).  For a more comprehensive 
summary of the current state of the law see Bennett, Polden and Rubin, Employment 
Relationships, Law and Practice, Looseleaf (updated 2004).
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5.1. Fire and rehire
There is a dominant shadow behind the question of variation of the 
employment contract; to what extent does regulation of the variation within 
the contract become practically meaningless if the employer is free to fire and 
then rehire employees on substantially different (and less favorable) terms. 
The interest in flexibility in US employment law is often seen as, to a large 
extent, protected by the presumption that a contract is “at-will,” thus 
permitting either the employer or employee to terminate the contract with no 
notice.  An employer, under an at-will contract, is therefore afforded 
flexibility by the ability to fire and then rehire employees on new terms. In 
England, there is no at-will presumption, but the Catamaran Cruises198 case 
demonstrates that similar considerations also arise within English law. 
5.1.1  The US story
In the majority of US states, an employer is free to terminate an 
employment relationship without notice and then offer reemployment on 
different terms.  An employer is also free to threaten an employee with total 
termination without reingagement if the new terms are not agreed to. The 
classic formulation of the rule was stated by Horace G. Wood:
“With us the rule is inflexible that a general or indefinite hiring is prima facie a 
hiring at-will, and if the servant seeks to make it out a yearly hiring, the burden 
198 Catamaran Cruises v. Williams [1994] IRLR 386 [hereinafter Catameran Cruises]
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is upon him to establish it by proof. A hiring at so much a day, week, month or 
year, no time being specified, is an indefinite hiring, and no presumption 
attaches that it was for a day even, but only at the rate fixed for whatever time 
the party may serve. It is competent for either party to show what the mutual 
understanding of the parties was in reference to the matter; but unless their 
understanding was mutual that the service was to extend for a certain fixed and 
definite period, it is an indefinite hiring and is determinable at the will of either 
party…”199
5.1.2 The English story
In order to see how this tension also appears with English law it is 
necessary to give a summary of the rather complex law in this area.200  English 
law has both common law and statutory mechanisms of dealing with the end 
of the employment relationship.  The common law action of wrongful dismissal
stems from the presumption that servants in agriculture were hired for a fixed 
term of one year201.  If an employer fires an employee without notice she is 
liable for the wages for the notice period.  These damages are subject to the 
duty to mitigate.202  An employer may only terminate without notice 
199 See H.G. Wood, A Treatise on the Law of Master and Servant § 134, at 272, supra 
note 4.
200 For further details see Simon Deakin and Gillian S. Morris, Labour Law (3d ed 
2001) Ch5; Harvey supra note 70.
201 Deakin and Morris, Labour Law, (3d ed 2001) 393.  This rule has its origins in the 
Statute of Artificers of 1563 and the poor laws of the seventeenth century
202 Gunton v. Richmond-upon-Thames London Borough Council [1980] I.C.R. 755, 722 
(Buckley LJ).
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(summary dismissal) where the employee is guilty of gross misconduct.203 To 
confuse matters, these notice periods are calculated by statute.204  Like the “at-
will” rule, this notice requirement also purports to be symmetrical. An 
employee must therefore give notice before resigning, as the employer can 
give notice of dismissal.  Reason for termination has no role to play in an 
action for wrongful dismissal, except in the case where the employer is 
claiming that they have summarily dismissed the employee in response to 
known gross misconduct.  This, however, is a simple application of the 
principles of repudiatory breach.  If the employee has “disregarded the 
essential conditions of the contract of service”205 the employer is entitled to 
accept this repudiation as termination of the contract.
The statutory concept of unfair dismissal has been present on UK law 
since the Industrial Relations Act in 1971. This action permits an evaluation of 
the reasons for dismissal if an employee has been continuously employed for 
more than one year206.   This is now governed by Part X of the Employment 
Rights Act 1996.   An employer is under a duty to show that the dismissal of 
an employee is due to a reason which:
(a) Is related to the capability or qualifications of the employee 
for performing work of the kind which he was employed by 
the employer to do (s98(2)(a)),
(b) relates to the conduct of the employee (s98(2)(b)),
203 And, after the Employment Act 2002, after the employer has operated a shortened 
disciplinary procedure as set out in the regulations to the Employment Act 2002, 
Sched 3.
204 S. 86 et seq. of the Employment Rights Act 1996
205 Laws v. London Chronicle, supra note WHICH 700 (per Lord Evershed M.R.).
206 s 108 Employment Rights Act 1996
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(c) is that the employee was redundant (s 98(2)(c), this is dealt 
with under Part XI of the Employment Rights Act 1996)
(d) is that the employee could not continue to work in the 
position which he held without contravention (either on his 
part or that of his employer) of a duty or restriction imposed 
by or under an enactment. (s98(2)(d))
(e) or some other substantial reason of a kind such as to justify 
the dismissal of an employee holding the position which the 
employee held. (s98(1)(b))
In addition the statute provides for various protected grounds which are 
automatically unfair.”207
Returning to Catamaran Cruises; in that case the employer had fired his 
employees and then offered them much less favorable contracts as a result of 
financial difficulties.  The Employment Appeal Tribunal held that the 
dismissal was not unfair as it was within the “band of reasonable responses” 
for “some other substantial reason” (s98(1)(b)).  The EAT held that the 
employees had been unreasonable not to have accepted the new terms.  The 
test, post Catamaran Cruises, is essentially one of balancing the interests.  What 
207 A list of automatically unfair reasons for dismisal: procedures under Schedule 2 to 
the Employment Act 2002 has not been completed (s98A); pregnancy, childbirth or 
maternity, maternity leave, parental leave, paternity leave, adoption leave (s99); 
actions as a heath and safety respresentitive (s100); shop workers refusal to work on 
a Sunday (s101); complaint under the working time regulations (s101A); actions as 
the trustee of an occupational pension scheme (s102); being an employee 
representitive under Chapter II of Part IV of the Trade Union and Labour Relations 
(Consolidation) Act (TULRCA) 1992); making a protected disclosure (s103A); 
assertion of a statutory right under s86 ERA, S68, 86, 146, 168, 168A, 169 and 170 of 
TULRCA (s 104); action taken with a view to enforcing the national minimum wage 
(s104A); action taken with a view to enforcing s25 Tax Credits Act 2002 (s104B); 
requesting flexible working (s104C).
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is clear, however, is that an employer is relatively safe to attempt to fire and 
then rehire, if it is rationally connected with a business reason and is not 
motivated by sharp practice.  Since Catamaran Cruises, the Employment Act 
2002 requires in addition that the minimal standard disciplinary and 
dismissal procedure set out in Part 1 of Schedule 2 is carried out in addition to 
the appropriate notice period, however these guarantees are only procedural 
rather than substantive.208
The shadow that both of these situations spread across any regulation 
of the conduct of the parties within the relationship, is whether any such 
regulation can be destroyed by the ease by which the parties can terminate 
the relationship.  Also, if regulation of terminations are governed by a 
principle which moves in one direction, how successful can a principle of 
good faith which moves along quite a different vector fare where the factual 
circumstances are closely interrelated?  Any regulation of the modes of 
variation must inevitably take into account how it will fit with any provision 
for the regulation of termination.
5.2 Hortatory principles and rule-application
208 This is a 3 step procedure requiring a statement of grounds for action and 
invitation to meeting, meeting and opportunity for appeal meeting.  Failure to 
comply with these procedures makes any resulting dismissal automatically unfair 
and subject to either reduction or inflation of the award by between 10-50% 
(depending on which party is at fault in causing this failure), S. 31 Employment Act 
2002.  See also Bob Hepple Q.C. and Gillian S. Morris, The Employment Act 2002 and 
the Crisis of Individual Employment Rights (2002) 31 I.L.J. 245
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Although Justice Holmes cautioned, “general propositions do not decide 
concrete cases,”209 questions of principle are unavoidable in adjudication. As 
Atiyah notes, “in the process of generalization, principles also attempt to give 
some overall structure, or rational shape to the law, not just in the interests of 
elegance but in the interests of consistency, of the desire to ensure that like is 
treated alike.”210
It is crucial that the principle of good faith be recognized and utilized 
as a principle, not only in interpretation of contracts, but in the interpretation 
of contract doctrine itself.  The hortatory function of good faith is an 
important counter balance against the pervasive hortatory function of the 
presumption of at-will termination. Both rules can, nevertheless, coherently 
coexist at the level of pragmatic rules within bounded spheres for pragmatic 
application.  For their role as principles, however, their conflict, far from 
being fatal, is important for the safeguarding of coherent balance between 
flexibility and certainty in course of employment.  At least part of the success 
of the recognition of the implied term of mutual trust and confidence has been 
because of its hortatory function.  
The hortatory effect of at-will is strong in US law.  We can see its 
hortatory effect in the cases where the courts refuse to accept the possibility of 
a handbook exception to at-will.  Although this hortatory fertilization has 
largely slipped in unnoticed in cases like Govier and in Jones V.C.J.’s dissent in 
Demasse, it has been resisted by some courts.  They have noted that extension 
of the rationales applied to at-will do not extend naturally into the variation 
209 Justice Holmes dissent in Lochner v New York 198 U.S. 45, 25 S.Ct. 539,76 (1905)
210 Atiyah, Pragmatism and Theory, supra note 20, at 27.
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cases as, “the cases which reason that the at-will rule takes precedence over 
even explicit job termination restraints, simply because the contract is of 
indefinite duration, misapply the at-will rule of construction as a rule of 
substantive limitation on contract formation."211 However this formal 
argument seems to be but a frail twig against the tide of much of the courts’ 
strong rhetoric of laissez faire and individual autonomy.  Nevertheless, 
instances of good faith are visible, and indeed unavoidable in the 
jurisprudence of employment contracts.
5.3 The ramifications of conflict
Duncan Kennedy has recognized a tension in Private Law adjudication 
between individualism and altruism.212  He notices that both contradictory 
visions which “emerge as biases or tendencies whose proponents have much 
in common and a large basis for adjustment through analysis of the 
particularizes of fact situations.”213  He notes that “there is a connection in the 
rhetoric of private law between individualism and a preference for rules, and 
between altruism and a preference for standards.”  This is not the same 
tension, as the one described above.  In the Atiyah-esque tension between the 
hortatory power of a principle of good faith and the situation specific 
211 Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 626 (Minn. 1983)
212 Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication 89 Harv L Rev 
1685 (1976).  Another interesting discussion of tension in the context of implied terms 
is contained in,  Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and 
Tort Law, with Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 
Maryland. L. Rev. 563 (1982)
213 Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication 89 Harv L Rev 
1685, 1776 (1976).
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application of a rule applied at its lowest level of abstraction, the abstract does 
not correlate with a more altruistic vision.  In current US employment law the 
principle of at will termination is pervasive at the abstract level through the 
rhetoric of flexibility.  However, Kennedy’s essay is helpful for this one in that 
he sees conflict at the level of hortatory principle as unavoidable.  The process 
of law, therefore must be able to go forward in light of this interminable 
conflict. Claire Dalton notes that theoretical duality exist in tension 
throughout contract law.214 However, despite this conflict she concludes that 
doctrinal talk is not “meaningless”215
Recognition of conflict between hortatory principles can be important 
for coherence at the level of rules. Although the modes of individualism and 
altruism, as described by Kennedy, do conflict at the highest level, this does 
not mean that appeal to one mode, automatically annihilates doctrines which 
have a shade of the other.
To see how lawyers can get through this, it should also be remembered 
that tension at the level of principle does not translate exactly into tension at 
the level of rule application.  Judges and legislators are not aiming at creating 
a mirror of a just society in the rules; these rules must be practicable and be 
likely to produce these effects.   Ramifications at the level of principle can take 
on a different shade at the level of rule application.  Although it is relatively 
easy to state a rule which would solve the case, ex post facto, it is much more 
214 Clare Dalton, Deconstructing Contract Doctrine 994 Yale. L.J. 997 (1985) especially at 
1007.
215 Dalton, Deconstructing Contract at 1009.   Ronald Dworkin also gives the argument, 
that conflict leads to insoluability, short shrift in Law’s Empire (1986, 441-444 in 
footnote 20).
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difficult to state one which would prevent it occurring ex ante.  As Scott and 
Krauss note, there is a difference between a rule, which is consistent with 
legal and moral principle but which may nevertheless have perverse incentive 
effects. This, it is argued, is captured in the essence of situation sense 
methodology.  Llewellyn’s Delphic comment, that situation sense is a 
compound of “Isness and Oughtness and what have you more,”216 can be 
understood as acknowledging this dimension to the deciding of cases.217
5.4. The rationalisation
To argue that the at-will rule in application is not impossible in a 
system which recognizes the principle of good faith, we must consider some 
of the differences between the situations of dismissal, fire and then rehire, and 
variation, as was attempted in Govier, Asmus, Bankey and Demasse.  Returning 
again to “situation sense” the rule must be applied to “type facts in their 
context.”  We must now look at those contexts in detail to see how they can be 
distinguished from one another coherently.
5.4.1 The argument from situation sense
Although it is clearly moving along a different vector at the level of 
principle, at the level of rule application the recognition of an obligation of 
good faith in variation of employment contracts does not necessarily subsume 
216 Karl Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals (1960) at 61
217 Although it should be acknowledged that this is a very different route from the 
one proposed by Kennedy.  For an example of his response to this conflict in 
individual dispute resolution see, Duncan Kennedy, Freedom & Constraint in 
Adjudication: A Critical Phenomenology, 36 J. Leg. Ed. 518 (1986)
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the presumption of at-will termination.  Although the vast majority of 
employment cases which consider “good faith” do so in the context of 
termination, this does not mean that good faith in variation will naturally 
become a doctrine of good faith termination.  These actions can be kept 
analytically distinct; they are different “type facts.”
A host of different considerations arise when we are considering issues 
of termination as opposed to variation.  This will be particularly so when we 
are considering a contract which provides specific restrictions on termination; 
for these to be variable at-will would negate any reason for the employee to 
have bargained for those enhanced terms.  These considerations have already 
been analysed in Chapter 2.  Breach of terms providing for added constraints 
on termination do not automatically bring the contract to an end, without 
more; the employee can still legitimately expect performance of the other 
contract terms.218
There are many reasons why an employer may wish to do this, for 
example if they are needing to accrue the necessary length of service with that 
one employer to be eligible for FMLA leave.219   The employer also may wish 
to vary the contract, but not to lose all of the benefits inherent in the 
relationship itself.  As was considered above, the employer, in the course of 
employment has “control” over the employee (or it does not constitute a 
contract of employment at all, and is merely a contract for services).   An 
employer in notifying employees of a variation is communicating an intention 
218 Provided that the employee does not elect to accept this fundamental breach as 
effecting repudiation.
219 See footnote 162.
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to maintain that control.  It is true that an employee can legally bring the 
relationship to an end at any time, but from the point of view of employee 
perception, a manifest intention on the part of the employer to maintain 
control may seem to be very different from a manifest intention by them to 
terminate. To treat all variations as if they terminate the entire relationship 
would be to ignore these relevant considerations.
5.4.2. The argument from autonomy
Also the principle of at-will termination is often justified by reference 
to considerations of autonomy.220  In the passage quoted from Horace Wood in 
the previous chapter it is clear that, if parties wish to vary the legal default of 
at-will, they are free to contract around it. In most of the cases cited in this 
paper the contractual term at issue was  a variation of the default, to require 
for cause termination or LIFO.  The principal of autonomy respects the liberty 
of the parties to contract out of any default they wish to provided there is 
agreement and consideration. The rule in Govier, which provided no 
protection for those autonomous bargains already entered into would violate 
the principle of autonomy. This is ironic, as the result in Govier is mostly 
buttressed by policy arguments usually seen in the context of proponents of 
at-will; in fact, the case runs counter to the guiding principle of autonomous 
dealing.
220 Epstein, In Defense of Contract at Will, 51 U. Chi. L.R. 947.  For an example of a 
prominent proponent of the autonomy principle in contract law see, Charles Fried, 
Contract as Promise: A Theory of Contractual Obligation (1981).
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5.4.3. The argument from cross-fertilization
Proponents of the at-will presumption in termination should also be 
comforted by the approach of the English courts to the implied term of 
mutual trust and confidence.  The House of Lords in Eastwood v. Magnox221 has 
very recently held that this does not, in any way constrain the manner of 
dismissal of an employee.  This is the exclusive domain of the statutory action 
for unfair dismissal.  Although the House of Lords, partly relied on an 
argument that, as a matter of statutory interpretation, the provisions of the 
Industrial Relations Act 1971 (now contained within the Employment Rights 
Act 1996, Part X) preclude any common law development in this area,222 the 
decision is founded on the rationale that dismissal is fundamentally different 
to the continuation of employment.  Parliament has only “occupied the field” 
with regard to unfair dismissal.223
To frame the debate in Eastwood it is necessary to provide a little 
background.  The year before, in Johnson v. Unisys224 the House of Lords had 
closed the door on the development of an action for damages for 
psychological harm due to the manner of dismissal under the implied term of 
mutual trust and confidence.  They rejected the broad proposition that the 
implied term of mutual trust and confidence implied a term “that the 
221 [2004] 1 W.L.R. 322 [hereinafter Eastwood]
222 per Lord Nicholls at para [14]. This is a similar manner to the judgment of Justice 
in Rehnquist in the Supreme Court in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp.  v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council Inc 435 U.S. 519  (1978), holding that the 
provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act 1946 precluded any supplementary 
development of the common law.  This method of argument has been strongly 
criticized for example by Lord Steyn in Eastwood at para[44]; Collins, Claim for 
Unfair Dismissal [2003] I.L.J. 305, Lizzie Barmes, The Continuing  Conceptual Crisis in 
the Common Law of the Contract of Employment, (2004) 67 (3) M.L.R. 435.
223 Eastwood supra note 221 at para 14 per Lord Nicholls
224 [2003] 1 AC 518
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employer must treat his employees fairly.” This was because the implied term 
of mutual trust and confidence did not extend to the conduct of termination.225
This introduced a distinction into the law of employment contracts that called 
into question how termination was to be differentiated from issued 
concerning termination.  Given that the quantum of damages which could be 
claimed under statute and under the common law term of mutual trust and 
confidence was potentially huge, the stakes for identifying a clear distinction 
were high.226
Although the facts of Eastwood and McCabe were difficult, Lord Nicholls 
held that “identifying the boundary of the ‘Johnson exclusion area’ as it has 
been called, is comparatively straightforward.”227 Although a seemingly 
continuous course of conduct from disciplinary process to dismissal “may 
have to be chopped artificially into separate pieces”228 the separation is held to 
nevertheless exist.  Although it is clear that the distinction drawn in Johnson is 
not particularly popular, many of the concerns relate to the low cap on 
damages for unfair dismissal.229
Lord Hoffmann in Johnson had primarily argued that the term of 
mutual trust and confidence “in the way it has always been formulated, is 
concerned with preserving the continuing relationship which should subsist 
between employer and employee.  So it does not seem altogether appropriate 
225 Eastwood supra note 221 at para 14 per Lord Nicholls
226 There is a “statutory cap” on the amount of damages which can be claimed under 
the statutory cause of action of unfair dismissal (currently £55,000).  However, 
actions under the implied term of mutual trust and confidence can run much higher.
227 Eastwood, supra note 221, para. 27.
228 Eastwood, supra note 221, para 31.
229 Cf Lizzie Barmes, The Continuing  Conceptual Crisis in the Common Law of the 
Contract of Employment, (2004) 67 (3) M.L.R. 435.
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for use in connection with the way that relationship is terminated.”230 He 
considered that, although it would be possible to imply a separate obligation 
to exercise the power of dismissal in good faith this was a different question, 
resting on different principles.231
Even Lord Steyn, in his dissent in Johnson, draws a distinction between 
hortatory principles, which can exist in conflict, and rules in application, 
which cannot.  For example, when responding to an argument by counsel for 
the employers that recognition of the extension of the implied term of mutual 
trust and confidence would conflict with the express term providing that 
dismissal may be made on 4 weeks notice,232 he was unsympathetic, claiming 
that “they can live together.” 
Therefore, the necessity of destroying the at-will presumption, were 
good faith performance to be recognized, is far from a fait accomplis.  There are 
considerations of both policy and principle for keeping them analytically 
distinct.
This discussion reaffirms the importance of recognizing the perpetual 
nature of Atiyah’s inherent common law tension between hortatory principles 
and rule application.  It also, however, reaffirms the importance of the courts 
being aware that this tension is always in play.   Only when this is recognized 
can factual patterns be distinguished from each other in a principled manner. 
230 Johnson, supra note 224,  at para 46, per Lord Hoffmann
231 Johnson, id., at para 4, citing the judgment of Iacobucci J in Wallace v. United 
Grain Growers Ltd 152 D.L.R. 4th 1.
232 Id., At para. 24
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6. Conclusions
It is now time to pull together all of the threads in this “comparative 
conversation” while avoiding falling into Candide-esque peril.  The 
proposition at the heart of this paper was that good faith is more useful in the 
employment context in both the US and the UK than is currently recognized, 
particularly in the specific example of handbook variation.  This seemingly 
simple proposition, however potentially ran into perils from many angles. 
Nevertheless, the paper has shown a plausible route through these. 
In finding a useful route for good faith doctrinally courts are able to 
sidestep the vast abstract controversy over “what good faith means” by 
viewing it as a doctrinal tool, capable of permitting the courts to legitimate 
expectations of the contracting parties. Expectations are legitimated if they 
are within the reasonable band of interpretations and expectations, but not if 
they come outside this and are likely to destroy the relationship of mutual 
trust and confidence.  This formulation of good faith is captured in Scalia J’s 
judgment in Tymshare, where he holds that the implied covenant of good faith 
provides that “reasonable expectations” of the parties are protected.233 If the 
doctrine of good faith is seen to work ex post as a legitimator of expectations 
arising out of the employment relationship, this eliminates the necessity to 
form a definite view in the Summers/ Burton debate as to whether good faith 
is an excluder or whether it protects legitimate expectations.
233 Tymshare, supra note 142, at 1152
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This view of good faith also has important practical implications for 
courts on both sides of the Atlantic. It is necessary to set the minds of the 
courts free from any temptation of treating the entire content of the contract 
as if it derives only from the subjective mind states of the individual parties.  
As mentioned in the first section, a complete contract ex ante is at most 
“vanishingly rare.”234 As subjective intent is unknowable, any content given to 
good faith will be that of “imputed intent” rather than actual hopes or 
expectations of the parties. “Conversational interpretation,”235 in the sense of 
interpreting words to divining true subjective “meaning” of the parties, is 
impossible in both the interpretation of contracts and statutory interpretation, 
as the text is settled at the time of formation.  
This aspect of good faith explains why the English implied term of 
mutual trust and confidence seems initially to fail the emphatically laissez faire
imbued tests for the implication of terms into contracts.  The courts, in 
developing the implied term of mutual trust and confidence have recognized 
that, as mentioned in the first section, both parties have a particularly strong 
interest in leaving the express terms incomplete in order to permit the 
employment relationship to evolve to changing circumstances.  This situation 
naturally leads to the increased visibility of legal background norms.  The 
invocation of “mutual trust and confidence” both conceptualizes the 
relationship as mutual, but also polices the edges of this relationship to 
exclude bad faith.  
234 supra fn 8.
235 Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire, (1986) Ch2.
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Viewing the operation of the implied term of mutual trust and 
confidence as an incidence of good faith also explains why in Mallone the 
courts could use the implied term of mutual trust and confidence as a 
principle to delimit an express discretion granted to the employer.  Under 
formalist contractual orthodoxy, this strong hortatory effect should not have 
been possible. In fact, a large amount of the success of the implied term of 
mutual trust and confidence can be traced to its hortatory effect, in that it 
appeals to the principle of good faith as a higher justification.  Many of the 
problems English lawyers seem to see with importing such a general concept 
of good faith can be allayed to large extent by much of the US literature.  Karl 
Llewellyn’s tool of situation sensitive reasoning is particularly helpful here.
On this side of the Atlantic the English experience of, what we have 
now concluded is an instance of good faith, can be used to explain why and 
how the courts can justify regulating handbook variations in the US.  When 
good faith is recognized as influencing the doctrinal framework it is possible 
to build a strong case for the implication of a term at law which constrains the 
employer’s ability to vary immediately unilaterally without notice.  As in 
United Bank v Akhtar,236 the implied obligation not to read the mobility clause 
in the contract so as to allow it to deprive the employee substantially of the 
benefits of the rest of the contract; in the situation of handbook variation good 
faith can also provide the justifying rationale for implying a term into the 
contract limiting the manner in which the employer may vary a handbook 
provision.
236 Supra note 95.
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The potential problem posed by any conflict between the hortatory 
function of good faith and the at-will presumption were faced head on in the 
fifth section of this article.  In order to combat this objection it was necessary 
to consider the nature of principles and policies directly and their function 
within the jurisprudence of the courts.  This is not in itself problematic if the 
court’s role is seen as one in itself in tension, between the need to decide the 
individual case and the need to ensure coherence in the law; and yet it is 
recognized that it is the courts continuing duty to make its way through this 
treacherously difficult territory with the aid of doctrinal constructs, such as 
the various doctrines of contract law, in order to demarcate the permissible 
from the impermissible.  
One of the most powerful tools at the courts command, which is of 
particular importance when dealing with such a seemingly abstract doctrine 
as good faith, is that of situation sense. This forces us to see that it is necessary 
to look at disputes from both the more abstract side, and than from that of the 
individual dispute.  By doing so, both a greater understanding and coherence 
can be achieved.  This is not to deny the inherent tensions between the 
specificity of the implied term and the breadth of the principle if stated as a 
rule.  However instead, it is to recognize that, as the hortatory function of the 
common law and the individual rule application function are always pulling 
in different directions, it is useful to look at these tensions from both sides of 
the lens. Atiyah’s analysis recognizes that the one cannot live without the 
other.  At the moment, in general, the US courts tend to be more content at the 
hortatory end of the spectrum than the English courts; although in the case of 
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handbook variation some of the US opinions lapse into more formal hidden 
implicit theorizing than some of the English cases.237 However, if neither 
dimension is ignored we can therefore ensure that questions are considered 
both from the abstract, coherence seeking analysis at the level of principle, 
and at the level of individual situation.  This brings us back to the very 
essence of the situation sense method. Without an appreciation of the 
principles behind a distinction between type facts, no rule classification can 
appropriately be made.  Situation sense, read, in this way, is a methodology 
for linking the justifications for the rules whilst being attentive to the factual 
patterns to avoid over and underbreadth of them in application.
237 For example contrast the reasoning og Jones VCJ in Asmus supra note 48, with 
Browne Wilkinson V.C. in Imperial Tobacco, supra note 121.
